Thus, critically, although a large amount of metadata is consolidated and preserved by the Government, the vast majority of that information is never seen by any person. Only information responsive to the limited queries that are authorized for counterterrorism purposes is extracted and reviewed by analysts. Although the number of unique identifiers has varied substantially over the years, in 2012, fewer than 300 met the “reasonable, articulable suspicion” standard and were used as seeds to query the data after meeting the standard. Because the same seed identifier can be queried more than once over time, can generate multiple responsive records, and can be used to obtain contact numbers up to three “hops” from the seed identifier, the number of metadata records responsive to such queries is substantially larger than 300, but it is still a tiny fraction of the total volume of metadata records. It would be impossible to conduct these queries effectively without a large pool of telephony metadata to search, as there is no way to know in advance which numbers will be responsive to the authorized queries.

[...]

The telephony metadata collection program is subject to an extensive regime of oversight and internal checks and is monitored by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FISC, and Congress, as well as the Intelligence Community. No more than twenty-two designated NSA officials can make a finding that there is “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that a seed identifier proposed for query is associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization, and NSA’s Office of General Counsel must review and approve any such findings for numbers believed to be used by U.S. persons. In addition, before the NSA disseminates any information about a U.S. person outside the agency, a high-ranking NSA official must determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact related to counterterrorism information and is necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or assess its importance. Among the program’s additional safeguards and requirements are: (1) audits and reviews of various aspects of the program, including “reasonable, articulable suspicion” findings, by several entities within the Executive Branch, including NSA’s legal and oversight offices and the Office of the Inspector General, as well as attorneys from DOJ’s National Security Division and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); (2) controls on who can access and query the collected data; (3) requirements for training of analysts who receive the data generated by queries; and (4) a five-year limit on retention of raw collected data.

In addition to internal oversight, any compliance matters in this program that are identified by the NSA, DOJ, or ODNI are reported to the FISC. The FISC’s orders to produce records under the program must be renewed every 90 days, and applications for renewals must report information about how the authority has been implemented under the prior authorization. Significant compliance incidents are also reported to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of both houses of Congress. Since the telephony metadata collection program under Section 215 was initiated, there have been a number of significant compliance and implementation issues that were discovered as a result of DOJ and ODNI reviews and internal NSA oversight. In accordance with the Court’s rules, upon discovery, these violations were reported to the FISC, which ordered appropriate remedial action. The incidents, and the Court’s responses, were also reported to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees in great detail. These problems generally involved human error or highly sophisticated technology issues related to NSA’s compliance with particular aspects of the Court’s orders. The FISC has on occasion been critical of the Executive Branch's compliance problems as well as the Government’s court filings. However, the NSA and DOJ have corrected the problems identified to the Court, and the Court has continued to authorize the program with appropriate remedial measures.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Angleton privately accused various foreign leaders of being Soviet spies. He twice informed the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that he believed Prime Minister Lester Pearson and his successor Pierre Trudeau to be agents of the Soviet Union. In 1964, under pressure from Angleton, the RCMP detained John Watkins, a close friend of Pearson and formerly Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Watkins died during interrogation by the RCMP and the CIA, and was subsequently cleared of suspicion. Angleton accused Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson of using their access to NATO secrets to benefit the USSR. Brandt resigned in 1974, after one of his aides was found to be a mole from the East German secret police. Angleton came to suspect Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who commented wryly that even the most brilliant and loyal officers should not spend their entire career in such pressurized and paranoid fields.[citation needed] Angleton also privately accused numerous members of Congress and President Gerald Ford of treason.[citation needed] Angleton's notorious pursuit of the "5th Man", who he believed had penetrated a secret agency in Washington, was solved, he believed, when DCI William Colby fired him.[citation needed] No one was above suspicion, and even Angleton himself was accused by others of working for the Soviets.[citation needed]

Resignation[edit source | editbeta]

Angleton's resignation was announced on Christmas Eve of 1974, just as President Ford demanded that Colby report on the allegations and as various Congressional committees announced that they would launch their own inquiries. Three of Angleton's senior aides in counter-intelligence, his deputy Raymond Rocca, executive officer of the counter-intelligence division William J. Hood, and Angleton's chief of operations Newton S. Miller, were coaxed into retirement within a week of Angleton's resignation after it was made clear that they would be transferred elsewhere in the agency rather than promoted, and the counter-intelligence staff was reduced from 300 people to 80 people.