In December 2002, Dowd told the New York Post that he had reliable evidence that Rose bet against his team but didn't include it in his 225-page report because of time constraints. He later backed off of those statements. "I was never able to tie it down," Dowd said. "It was unreliable, and that's why I didn't include it in the report. I probably shouldn't have said it. I was not trying to start something here."

According to the Dowd report, which included a diary of bets that Rose made on Reds games and many others — it listed bets on 390 games over all, 52 of them involving the Reds, in a three-month period in 1987 — Rose developed a consistency of not betting on certain contests.

In particular, Rose stopped betting on Reds games that Gullickson started. If Rose bet on his team to win other games but didn’t bet on Gullickson’s games, he was sending a signal to the bookies he was betting with that he, as manager of the team, didn’t think much of his team’s chances in those games.

It matters for two reasons. First, when Rose did not bet on the Reds, his inaction was a signal to his bookies that he wasn’t very confident in that game. Those bookies may have used this inside information to place a bet against the Reds. This doesn’t mean the game was fixed, but is reflective of Rose’s state of mind. He was compromised. Second, his wager on certain games, but not others, may have influenced the way he made decisions as a manager.

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Differing bet amounts are telling. If he bet $100 one game and $1,000 another game, what message is he telling his team? Or his bookie? Or himself? It shows he had fluid levels of confidence in certain games versus others. This distinction is important. For example, according to John Dowd, when certain Reds’ pitchers took the mound, Rose didn’t bet at all.