I think it's fairly easy to see how the situation will evolve without changes. And the solution is simple too.

But first, some preliminaries.

1. The people doing the bombings of Israelies aren't the PA police and political leaders that Israel is targeting with their preemptive attacks/assasinations/missile attacks/whatever you want to call them. The suicide bombers are incited by and controlled by extremists who aren't under Arafat's control. Israel's actions are counterproductive to its own interests.

2. The Israelies can't "win" a military conflict with the Palestinians, and neither can the Palestinians with the Israelies. A war with enough forces involved to cause either Israel to cease to exist or to cause the Palestinians to cease to live in the occupied territories isn't in the interest of either side and won't happen. Coexistence is going to have to be part of the solution.

3. Israel has no control over how long any "quick" war against its opposition lasts. Remember that its invasion of Lebanon was supposed to be a quick operation too - it lasted 10 years. If Israel decided to take Krauthammer's and Kelley's advice (quick war, kick the terrorists out, etc., etc.), there would be great pressure in Israel to keep control over the territory after they "won", especially if there were many Israeli casualties. They couldn't just declare victory and go home and hope the situation wouldn't revert to what's going on now (and likely worse). Look at Lebanon. Look at Cyprus. Look at Northern Ireland.

4. An attack by Israel on Palestinian areas would lead to even more widespread criticism and condemnation of Israel by the world. The US has laws against using US-supplied defensive arms in offensive actions, so there would be pressure in Congress to cut-off aid, apply sanctions, etc. Such efforts may well fail, but it would certainly endanger US aid and investment in Israel, further damaging Israel's economy. It would be counterproductive.

With all these factors, and more I haven't listed, it would be foolhardy, IMO, for Israel to think that there's a military solution to its conflict with the Palestinians. It will just lead to more death and anger and frustration and revenge and put a real solution even farther off. Israel and the Palestinians have to find a negotiated solution.

"How?"

Simple.

Carrots and sticks must be provided to both sides. They must see that there are rewards for coming to a peaceful settlement, just as was the case with Israel and Egypt. And there must be a stick of restricted trading rights or something similar to let them know that there are costs for not coming to an agreement.

Israel and the Palestinians must get support in the world community (the US, Arab states and some European countries in particular) for, e.g, a fund to promote economic development on the West Bank and Gaza. The people must know that there are concrete benefits for compromise.

And, as someone here said a while back, Israel must find a way to quit regarding the Palestinians as a monolithic block and start dividing its attention from responding to extremists to supporting moderates and centrists. Not by looking for Israeli toadies, but by putting forth concrete proposals which can be acted on unilaterally and sticking with them even in the face of suicide bombings and inflamitory rhetoric because it's the right thing to do for Israel's sake.

Will finding a way to negotiate be pain-free? No. But its a much more sensible thing to do than muddle along the same path with the same tired rhetoric while hundreds or thousands more die. It's clear, it's simple, and it's what has to happen eventually.

For those who disagree, consider other examples throughout the world. East Timor. Kashmir. Cyprus. Northern Ireland. Chechnya. Macedonia. And on and on. A military solution can't be imposed on people on the ground without their consent. It may take years, but eventually negotiation happens to end conflicts. And each side has to compromise. Israel and Palestine isn't any different.

My $0.02.

Cheers,
Scott.

There is some validity to your view. But I believe it's wrong in general, but I don't think we're going to convince each other. :-)

But on one point I must comment.

And you might note - Egypt came to their understanding with Israel after being soundly trounced.

Not in 1973 they weren't.

[link|http://campus.northpark.edu/history/WebChron/MiddleEast/YomKippurWar.html|Yom Kippur War] is a decent quick summary.

The path leading up to the Yom Kippur war had two major factors. First, there was a failure to resolve territorial disputes arising from the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. These disputes involved the return of the Sinai to Egypt and the return of the Golan Heights to Syria. UN Resolution 242 and Egyptian President Sadat\ufffds peace initiative failed to bring peace. Sadat wanted to sign an agreement with Israel provided the Israelis returned all the occupied territories, but Israel refused to withdraw to the pre-1967 armistice lines. Since no progress was being made toward peace, Sadat was convinced that to change things and gain legitimacy at home, he must initiate a war with limited objectives.

The second factor leading up to the war was the assurance Israel\ufffds general staff felt that Israel was safe from Arab attack for the indefinite future. Therefore, Israel felt no reason to trade territory for peace. Israel felt this way because of the Israel Defense Force\ufffds strength, the disarray of the Arab world, and the large buffer zone around Israel formed by the Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Thus in spite of Sadat\ufffds threats of war throughout 1972 and much of 1973, Israel\ufffds commanders were unprepared for the October attack of Egypt and Syria. They misinterpreted the buildup of armed forces along the canal as military exercises instead of an attack.

The surprise attack on two fronts from Egypt and Syria began on October 6, 1973, which was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year for the Jewish people. Egypt\ufffds forces swiftly crossed the Suez Canal and overran the Bar-Lev line. Syria moved into the Golan Heights and nearly reached the 1967 border with Israel (overlooking the Hula Basin). Israel was outnumbered in the north nearly 12 to 1 (there were 1,100 Syrian tanks versus 157 Israeli tanks); therefore, the first few days of the war saw Israeli counterattacks fail as Israel suffered hundreds of casualties and lost nearly 150 planes.

The tide of the war began to turn on October 10. The Syrians were pushed back and Israel advanced into Syria proper. The Soviet Union responded by sending airlifts to Damascus and Cairo, which were answered on October 12 and 13 by massive US airlifts to Israel. Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army on October 21.

[...]

The war\ufffds repercussions were far-reaching. An estimated 8,500 Arab soldiers were killed, and economic losses equaled the GNP for one year. The war also increased the Arabs\ufffd dependency on the Soviet Union. Approximately 6,000 Israeli soldiers were killed or wounded in 18 days, and Israel\ufffds losses were equivalent to their annual GNP. The image of an invincible Israeli army from the 1967 war was destroyed, Arab confidence was increased, and Israel became more dependent on the US for military, diplomatic, and economic aid. Internationally, the war emboldened the organization of petroleum exporting countries to double its oil prices. The US experienced gasoline shortages because of an embargo placed on countries that assisted Israel. The rise in oil prices began a trend of worldwide inflation and a recession in 1974-1975.

The 1973 war wasn't as lopsided as the 1967 war. Another timeline is [link|http://history.acusd.edu/gen/20th/nixon-mideast.html|here].

And I recall reading a story in Time magazine about the war in which it was claimed that Israel had nuclear weapons on standby in case things got worse. They certainly viewed it at the time as a serious threat to their existence, as did the US.

Israel had huge losses, as did Egypt and Syria. It wasn't a simple "sound trouncing" inflicted on Egypt by Israel.

Cheers,
Scott.

By "simple" I mean it's clear what must be done. A new type of solution doesn't need to be found, but rather the same old tired approach of negotiations with visible tangible rewards and disincentives must be used.

Which "view"?

The view that Israel's policy of blowing up people is reasonable and understandable.

And *that* is what brought [Egypt] the bargaining table - the failure to win with force of arms.

Many argue that it's Sadat that brought Israel to the table via the 1973 war, not the other way around. See the link above.

Again, how would you get the PLO to the bargaining table, and make them use good faith?

Neither side is negotiating in good faith at the moment. It's not all the PA's fault.

Carrots and Sticks have to be used, just as in the past. Someone, maybe the US, has to talk to both sides - Israel and the PA - with a substantial package of incentives and disincentives to get them to discuss what they'll accept and not accept. Outside parties like the US has to find a way to help build consensus.

It's a "simple" process. Is it easy? No. I don't have a magic formula, but I know what process has to be used. Blowing up people (by either side) isn't going to solve the problem.

Finally, I think this came up earlier in this thread... Here's a counterpoint on Barak's offer to the PA earlier this year:

[link|http://www.palestinemonitor.org/mustafa/notbarakproposal.htm|Why Palestinians could not accept Barak's proposal] It's possible to have honest disagreements about how generous the Barak proposal was and whether it would have made a viable Palestinian state possible.

I think I've said my peace on this topic.

Cheers,
Scott.