Read your Art of War:

All warfare is based on deception.

Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity.

When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near.
[...]

Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance.

[The Art of War includes substantial commentaries on the writings of Sun Tzu, I've elided them above. KMSelf]

Tu Mu:: Twoar the end of the Ch'in dynasty, Mo Tun of the Hsiung Nu first established his power. The Easter Hu were strong and sent ambassadors to parley. They said: 'We wish to obtian "T'ou Ma's thousand-li [li: approx. 1/3 mile -- thus, a horse that could travel 300 miles without grass or water] horse'. Mo Tun consulted his advisers who all exclaimed: 'The thousand-li horse! The most precious thing in this country! Do not give them that!' Mo Tun replied: 'Why begurdge a horse to a neighbour?' So he sent the horse.

[The story continues with demands made, and met, for a princess. The next request was for land. Mo Tun drew the line: 'Land is the foundation of the State. How could one give it away?'. Advisor suggesting same were sacked. To the neck -- which was sufficient.]

Mo Tun then sprang on his horse, ordered that all who remained behind were to be beheade, and made a surpise attack on the Eastern Hu. The easter Hu were contemptuous of him an had made no proparations. When he attacked he annihilated them. Mo Tun then turned westward and attacked the Yueh Ti [...and several other kingdoms].

Ch'en Hao: Give the enemy young boys and women to ifatuate him and jades and silks to excite his ambitions.

The Western tradition here is a variant of "flattery will get you anything".
Citations taken from Samuel B. Griffith's translation of The Art of War, Oxford Paperbacks, 1963.

The problem with the Taliban is that they're exploiting strengths (theirs, and ours against us), but to no clear victory. They can prod and poke at the United States and other nations throughout the world. They cannot topple them. And, at best, they remain rulers of a rubble heap.

Incidentally, The Art of War is online, as usual, [link|http://www.google.com/search?q=%22the+art+of+war%22+%22sun+tzu%22&btnG=Google+Search|Google rocks], [link|http://www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html|this site] looks good.

Earlier in "Estimates", Sun Zu writes:

War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.

Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors and make comparisons of the seven elements later named. So you may assess its essentials.

The first of these factors is moral influence; the second, weather; the third, terrain; the fourth, command; and the fifth, doctrine.

By moral influence, I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.

I do not see the Taliban having, or securing by its actions, moral influence.

Further:

Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged.

For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.

[...]

Those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts nor more than one provisioning.

Analyses I'm seeing suggest the Taliban's success requires provisioning or supply routes to remain open, likely through Pakistan. It's thought they don't have the means to sustain a conflict internally. Their own lawlessness is a strength to themselves -- foreign supporters would be far more susceptible to US influence. One story suggests nuclear weapons (more likely radiation weapons rather than nuclear explosives).

My sense is, given past actions, this would be a death sentence for the Taliban -- the US has the ability to lay waste to the entire country if needs be. If sufficiently provoked, and if it is clear that this is the only means of remove the scourge, we will do so. I emphasize this is a contingency, and not a primary strategy.

Regarding offensive strategies:

Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.

Li Chuan: Do not put a premium on killing

To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company, or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them.

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy;

Tu Mu:...He who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they areise. He who excels in conquering his enemies triumphs before threats materialze.
Li Ch'uan:Attack plans at their inception...

Next best is to disrupt his alliances

Net best is to attack his army

The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.

[...]

Your aim is to take All-under-Heaven intact....

Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy's one, surround him;

When five times his strength, attack him.

[Various descending force scenarios.]

...And if in all resepects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful.

The advice about fighting smart is well taken. Prophylactic actions could likely have avoided the current scenario, though whether this could have been done without raising hackles in the mideast is doubtful. Having absorbed the first hit, the US doesn't need to seek justification for its response. We've done a pretty good job of disrupting any Taliban / Al Qaeda alliances -- there are no overt supporters of any significance for the Taliban. We're doing fairly good work on their armed forces.

Some of the assumptions of Sun Tzu's time have changed -- it's possible for both us and the enemy to slip past lines and inflict damages. However the logistics of significant troop movements has not changed -- neither we nor they can move large forces without respect for the other's position and presence.

Regards the last point: the Taliban and Al Qaeda are by any measure a force inferior to the US. In the face of direct onslaught, they can do nothing but retreat. Retreating into the shelter of their own people loses the first factor of success: moral influence. They are drawing destruction on their own people, intentionally.

Unlike any military action since World War II, this need not be a limited action. The US was constrained by both Cold War and homeland realities in its involvement in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia. Credible evidence to me indicates there's little if any limit to actions ObL will consider. Stop at all costs becomes a tenable position. And, in this light, the Taliban and Al Qaeda do not have any militarially supportable option but surrender or elimination. The only mistake the US can make is in treating this as anything but total war. Humanitarian activities are best left outside the kill zone, and all efforts made to move noncombatents to same.

The only quarrel I have with your comments on minimizing civilian casualties is that you're wagging the dog. Rather than hobbling the military, move the innocents out of the way.