But it's a good start.

Banks know about secure hardware. Vendors who sell to banks know about secure hardware because the banks make sure they know about secure hardware. When a vendor won't meet a bank's physical security test, the bank is just as likely to elsewhere.

I'm beginning to think that Diebold's problem isn't really that they make insecure voting machines, but that because we know they make ATMs (which are secure), we're expecting them to also make secure voting machines.

Perhaps there is a way to combine the ATM-like security in an ATM-like way with voting. What if each vote costs you a dollar at voting time? Put your dollar bill/coin in and direct which box it falls in. With all funds going to the candidate, win, lose or draw? Then Joe Public would be really interested in the security being right. If you made the boxes transparant, you could see which candidate is winning with a glance. The voter would want to see their dollar getting into the right box, too. And 'cause it's real money, the counting would be secured and all parties would be interested in getting right...

Hmm. Sounds an awful lot like paper ballots. That wasn't intentional, I swear! :-)

Wade.