Post #185,597
11/30/04 4:22:03 PM
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Bah. Risk is the issue.
...and there are more risks than simply "proceeding as normal". One is that they would (in parallel) gain access to the new-password mailbox through sniffing, cracking or other means. Another is that they mount a DOS on my mailbox through the "new password" feature. For some mail systems, these would go hand-in-hand. Secure systems require examining all the risks, not just the original risk for which your technology was designed.
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Post #185,600
11/30/04 4:23:51 PM
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So what's YOUR suggestion?
Regards,
-scott anderson
"Welcome to Rivendell, Mr. Anderson..."
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Post #185,606
11/30/04 4:39:05 PM
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Unfortunately for you #1 ;)
But looking at #2, it should be possible to secure the plaintext pword DB on a limited-services box. If the server also does FTP, SSH, what-have-you, it becomes less desirable.
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Post #185,607
11/30/04 4:41:00 PM
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WTF?
How is #2 any more secure than #3?
Regards,
-scott anderson
"Welcome to Rivendell, Mr. Anderson..."
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Post #185,608
11/30/04 4:44:04 PM
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Sorry. You're right. I didn't read carefully.
I glossed over the email part.
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Post #185,609
11/30/04 4:47:21 PM
11/30/04 4:48:36 PM
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So how does that change your answer?
And I'm mainly interested to see if you have any suggestions for automated functionality.
But if we were to do #1, there's still the issue of me authenticating requests for password changes (if I'm doing the changing) or email snooping if I'm resetting and sending a new one.
There's also option #4 at the end of the thread.
Regards,
-scott anderson
"Welcome to Rivendell, Mr. Anderson..."
Edited by admin
Nov. 30, 2004, 04:48:36 PM EST
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Post #185,603
11/30/04 4:30:48 PM
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Same risk than we have now during login.
And with CRCs suggestion that there be a limit on tries/hour, a DOS on your mailbox is NOT an issue.
Imric's Tips for Living
- Paranoia Is a Survival Trait
- Pessimists are never disappointed - but sometimes, if they are very lucky, they can be pleasantly surprised...
- Even though everyone is out to get you, it doesn't matter unless you let them win.
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Nothing is as simple as it seems in the beginning,
As hopeless as it seems in the middle,
Or as finished as it seems in the end.
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Post #185,605
11/30/04 4:37:17 PM
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Same outcome, different risk--the attack surface has doubled
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Post #185,678
12/1/04 2:33:03 AM
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Not mine.
"The other" Scott's: [link|/forums/render/content/show?contentid=185579|Post #185579].
[link|mailto:MyUserId@MyISP.CountryCode|Christian R. Conrad]
(I live in Finland, and my e-mail in-box is at the Saunalahti company.)
Your lies are of Microsoftian Scale and boring to boot. Your 'depression' may be the closest you ever come to recognizing truth: you have no 'inferiority complex', you are inferior - and something inside you recognizes this. - [link|http://z.iwethey.org/forums/render/content/show?contentid=71575|Ashton Brown]
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Post #185,716
12/1/04 2:04:43 PM
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Can we please weight the risks
against benefits and against the importance of the information being protected? I have hard time imagining someone using mailbox spoofing just to get access to my IWETHEY identity. DOSes can be easily prevented by limiting the number of resets per day.
--
This guy's ahead of his time! He's using quantum programming methods: in universes where invalid data is passed to this function, it does not return. Thus you are ensured that you will only have valid data after calling it. Optimally you'd destroy the universe on failure, but computers haven't quite advanced to that level yet.
-- [link|http://thedailywtf.com/archive/2004/10/26/2920.aspx|The] Daily WTF
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