Sitting in his office in downtown Washington, Gingrich searched on his computer for the Web site of the Coalition Provisional Authority, set up in Baghdad to oversee the reconstruction and democratization of Iraq. \ufffdI\ufffdm told over there that CPA stands for \ufffdCan\ufffdt Produce Anything\ufffd,\ufffd says Gingrich. \ufffdHome page of the New Iraq,\ufffd he quotes. Then: \ufffdThe opening quote is, of course, by [CPA chief Paul] Bremer. Next quote is by Bush. Next quote is by U.S. Ambassador Steve Mann.\ufffd He scrolls down. \ufffdNow this is a big breakthrough. They do have the new Iraqi ambassador to the U.S. On the front page. That is a breakthrough,\ufffd he repeats, adding, sotto voce, \ufffdI have been beating the crap out of them for two weeks on this.\ufffd His basic point: where are the Iraqi faces in the New Iraq? \ufffdAmericans can\ufffdt win in Iraq,\ufffd he says. \ufffdOnly Iraqis can win in Iraq.\ufffd

Gingrich argues that the administration has been putting far too much emphasis on a military solution and slighting the political element. \ufffdThe real key here is not how many enemy do I kill. The real key is how many allies do I grow,\ufffd he says. \ufffdAnd that is a very important metric that they just don\ufffdt get.\ufffd He contends that the civilian-run CPA is fairly isolated and powerless, hunkered down inside its bunker in Baghdad. The military has the money and the daily contact with the locals. But it\ufffds using the same tactics in a guerrilla struggle that led to defeat in Vietnam.

\ufffdThe Army\ufffds reaction to Vietnam was not to think about it,\ufffd he says. Rather than absorb the lessons of counterinsurgency, Gingrich says, the Army adopted \ufffda deliberate strategy of amnesia because people didn\ufffdt want to ever do it again.\ufffd The Army rebuilt a superb fighting force for waging a conventional war. \ufffdI am very proud of what [Operation Iraqi Freedom commander Gen.] Tommy Franks did\ufffdup to the moment of deciding how to transfer power to the Iraqis. Then,\ufffd said Gingrich, \ufffdwe go off a cliff.\ufffd

In essence, the Americans never did transfer power. They disbanded the Iraqi Army and the government, realized that was a mistake, and quickly tried to cobble together an Iraqi police force and military. But the Iraqis in uniform today are seen by too many Iraqi citizens as American collaborators. Gingrich faults the Americans for not quickly establishing some sort of Iraqi government, however imperfect. \ufffdThe idea that we are going to have a corruption-free, pristine, League of Women Voters government in Iraq on Tuesday is beyond naivete,\ufffd he scoffs. \ufffdIt is a self-destructive fantasy.\ufffd (The White House insists that it is paying close attention to local politics and has speeded up the timetable to turn over power to the Iraqis.)

The rumor mill in the Pentagon suggests that Bush\ufffds \ufffdexit strategy\ufffd is to get American troops coming home in waves by next November\ufffds election. Obliquely, Gingrich indicates that would be a huge mistake. The guerrillas cannot be allowed to believe that they only have to outlast the Americans to win. \ufffdThe only exit strategy is victory,\ufffd Gingrich says. But not by brute American force. \ufffdWe are not the enforcers. We are the reinforcers,\ufffd says Gingrich. \ufffdThe distinction between these two words is central to the next year in Iraq.\ufffd Gingrich\ufffds voice rang with his customary certainty. Hard to know if Rumsfeld and Bush are listening.