Given its policy of refusing to sell to retailers that discount its goods below suggested prices, petitioner (Leegin) stopped selling to respon-dent\ufffds (PSKS) store. PSKS filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that Leeginviolated the antitrust laws by entering into vertical agreements withits retailers to set minimum resale prices. [...]

I can find no change in circumstances in the past several decades that helps the majority\ufffds position. In fact, there has been one important change that argues strongly to the contrary. In 1975, Congress repealed the McGuire and Miller-Tydings Acts. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801. And it thereby consciously extended Dr. Miles\ufffd per se rule. Indeed, at that time the Department of Justice and the FTC, then urging application ofthe per se rule, discussed virtually every argument pre-sented now to this Court as well as others not here pre-sented. And they explained to Congress why Congresss hould reject them. See Hearings on S. 408, at 176\ufffd177 (statement of Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division); id., at 170\ufffd172 (testimony of Lewis A. Engman, Chairman of the FTC); Hearings on H. R. 2384, at 113\ufffd114 (testimony of Keith I. Clearwaters, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division). Congress fully understood, and consequently intended, that the result of its repeal of McGuire and Miller-Tydings would be to make minimum resale price maintenance per se unlawful. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94\ufffd466, pp. 1\ufffd3 (1975) (\ufffdWithout [the exemptions authorized by the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts,] the agreements they authorize would violate the antitrust laws. . . . [R]epeal of the fair trade laws generally will prohibit manufacturers from enforcing resale prices\ufffd). See also Sylvania, supra, at 51, n. 18 (\ufffdCongress recently has expressed its approval of a per se analysis of vertical price restrictions by repealing those provisions of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Actsallowing fair-trade pricing at the option of the individual States\ufffd).

Congress did not prohibit this Court from reconsidering the per se rule. But enacting major legislation premised upon the existence of that rule constitutes importantpublic reliance upon that rule. And doing so aware of the relevant arguments constitutes even stronger reliance upon the Court\ufffds keeping the rule, at least in the absence of some significant change in respect to those arguments.

[...]

The only safe predictions to make about today\ufffds decision are that it will likely raise the price of goods at retail and that it will create considerable legal turbulence as lower courts seek to develop workable principles. I do not be-lieve that the majority has shown new or changed condi-tions sufficient to warrant overruling a decision of suchlong standing. All ordinary stare decisis considerations indicate the contrary. For these reasons, with respect, I dissent.