[link|http://www.msnbc.com/news/876128.asp?cp1=1|And what he taught us about Saddam's techniques]

Excerpt:

Kamel said Iraq had not abandoned its WMD ambitions. The stocks had been destroyed to hide the programs from the U.N. inspectors, but Iraq had retained the design and engineering details of these weapons. Kamel talked of hidden blueprints, computer disks, microfiches and even missile-warhead molds. \ufffdPeople who work in MIC [Iraq\ufffds Military Industrial Commission, which oversaw the country\ufffds WMD programs] were asked to take documents to their houses,\ufffd he said. Why preserve this technical material? Said Kamel: \ufffdIt is the first step to return to production\ufffd after U.N. inspections wind down.
Kamel was interrogated in separate sessions by the CIA, Britain\ufffds M.I.6 and a trio from the United Nations, led by the inspection team\ufffds head, Rolf Ekeus. NEWSWEEK has obtained the notes of Kamel\ufffds U.N. debrief, and verified that the document is authentic. NEWSWEEK has also learned that Kamel told the same story to the CIA and M.I.6. (The CIA did not respond to a request for comment.)
The notes of the U.N. interrogation\ufffda three-hour stretch one August evening in 1995\ufffd show that Kamel was a gold mine of information. He had a good memory and, piece by piece, he laid out the main personnel, sites and progress of each WMD program. Kamel was a manager\ufffdnot a scientist or engineer\ufffdand, sources say, some of his technical assertions were later found to be faulty. (A military aide who defected with Kamel was apparently a more reliable source of tech-nical data. This aide backed Kamel\ufffds assertions about the destruction of WMD stocks.) But, overall, Kamel\ufffds information was \ufffdalmost embarrass-ing, it was so extensive,\ufffd Ekeus recalled\ufffdincluding the fact that Ekeus\ufffds own Arabic translator, a Syrian, was, according to Kamel, an Iraqi agent who had been reporting to Kamel himself all along.