Particularly near the end.

When the Iraqis produced chemical munitions they appeared to adhere to a \ufffdmake and use\ufffd regimen. Judging by the information Iraq gave the United Nations, later verified by on-site inspections, Iraq had poor product quality for their nerve agents. This low quality was likely due to a lack of purification. They had to get the agent to the front promptly or have it degrade in the munition. This problem would have been less severe in their mustard rounds because of less aggressive impurities. The problem of degradation inhibited their ability to deploy and employ nerve weapons but probably did not have a great effect on their use of mustard. Using their weapons soon after production probably worked well in the Iran-Iraq War, where the skies over Iraq were controlled by the Iraqis. Unfortunately for the Iraqis, loss of air control in the Gulf meant the weapons could never reach the front. The chemical munitions found in Iraq after the Gulf War contained badly deteriorated agents and a significant proportion were visibly leaking.
That matches what I had heard before.

It's also possible that they've managed to beat their storage problems.

But then they'd also need to have the facilities to manufacture quantities of these agents. And so far, none have been located.

Which is why I replied to Boxley that way. The Iraqis MIGHT have agents, but if they do, I believe they have small quantities of them (aka "laboratory quantities") and that these will not pose any real threat (read: "the threat posed by the chemical agents will be less than the threat posed by conventional weapons").

Which is the reason, I believe, that the inspectors are having such a hard time finding any. It's not too difficult to find a ton of something. It's a lot harder to find a quart.

Now, on the other hand, Iraq still has the KNOWLEDGE of how to produce these agents. And, as you've noted, the ingrediants are not that unusual for an industrial nation.