I think ......
that the argument that countries NOT included in the so called axis of evil
expose rank hypocrisy.......and (for some) proves that the administration are
selecting their targets capriciously.......is at best misguided.
Here's my cut on the difference.
Israel has been threatened with getting stomped into the ground for much of its existence. Its desire to have a deterrent against this (not perceived but very real) threat is very understandable.
Pakistan/India
Pakistan's desire for Nuclear weapons stems from India's desire for Nuclear weapons. Pakistan became strategically very important when Russia invaded Afghanistan. It's generally thought that we turned a blind eye to their weapons program largely because it promised a convenient deterrence to soviet expansion.
Asking them to disarm when their neighbor had been invaded was not likely to be
a winner.
Since the pullout of Afghanistan by Russia, the U.S.A has tried hard to convince both India and Pakistan to climb down. Both diplomatically and with sanctions. One part of the problem is that India has a very active domestic nuclear program which is intertwined with its military program. Aasking them to
drop both is a difficult thing to achieve. Pakistan will be reluctant to drop
its (purely military) program if India has ANY program. These two nations have
been at war several times and continue to have conflicts in the region of Kashmir.
Then along came Afghanistan (again). Once again, Pakistan was strategically very important. They acted in the interests of the U.S.A. So its perhaps not expedient to include them on your list of "axis of evil" states. Particularly since Pakistan has shown great willingness to talk/negotiate/dialogue on the issue of non-proliferation and disarmament.
Smacks of political expediency? Abso-fucking-lutely! Does this somehow make Iraq's activities or Noth Korea's activities less of a concern?
I don't think so.
Here's a chronology of the activities of the "players".
The parrallels between N. Korea and Iraq are there if you want to see them.
If you don't.....you probably won't.
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North Korea
1962: North Korea sets up an atomic energy research center with Soviet help.
1964: Chinese help prospect for uranium.
1967: North Korea starts up small Soviet-supplied reactor.
1969-70: Soviet Union sends FROG-5 and FROG-7A missiles to North Korea.
1974: North Korea joins IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency).
1975: North Korea produces first plutonium -- a few grams.
1976: In return for military aid during the 1973 Middle East war, Egypt sends Soviet Scud-B missiles to North Korea.
1977: North Korea agrees to international inspection of Soviet-supplied equipment.
1977: Kang Song-San, a high party official, visits China's Lop Nur nuclear test site.
1979: Starts to build 30-megawatt thermal reactor that can produce enough plutonium for one bomb a year.
1983: A terrorist bomb linked to North Korea kills four South Korean cabinet members in Rangoon.
1984: North Korea successfully tests its first reverse-engineered Scud-B missile.
1984: An Iranian businessman and a Soviet emigre are indicted in New York for conspiring to smuggle U.S. missile guidance components to North Korea.
1985: Iran agrees to finance the development of North Korean Scud missiles in exchange for Scud-B technology and an option to buy the missiles when they become available.
1985: Signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), promising not to produce a bomb and to open all nuclear sites to inspection. In return, Soviets promise North Korea several large power reactors.
1985: Starts to build a 200-Mwt. reactor that can produce enough plutonium for 7 to 10 bombs a year.
1985: Also starts to build large plant to process plutonium into weapon-ready form.
1986: Begins to produce plutonium in 30-Mwt. reactor.
1987: Misses the first 18-month deadline for the beginning of international inspections. Inspectors grant 18-month extension.
1987: North Korean agents bomb a South Korean airliner with 115 passengers to retaliate for being barred from Seoul Olympics.
1987: Iran and North Korea sign a $500 million arms deal that includes the purchase of 90 to 100 Scud-Bs by Tehran.
1987-88: North Korea delivers approximately 100 Scud-B missiles to Iran.
1988: U.S. puts North Korea on its list of nations supporting terrorism.
1988: Misses second deadline for beginning international inspections, and demands "legal assurances" that U.S. won't threaten it with nuclear weapons.
1989: Continues to refuse nuclear inspections.
1989: Secretly unloads, according to CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), enough plutonium-bearing fuel to make one or two nuclear bombs.
1989: Begins to process plutonium into nuclear-ready form.
1989: Starts to build 800-Mwt. reactor that can produce plutonium for 30 to 40 bombs a year.
1989: Proposes talks with South Korea on denuclearizing the peninsula.
1989: Two Japanese companies reportedly ship spectrum analyzers to North Korea, which can be used to improve missile accuracy.
1990: Threatens to drop out of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty unless U.S. removes all nuclear weapons from the peninsula.
1990: U.S. fines German firm Degussa for illegally supplying U.S.-origin reactor material to North Korea.
1990: Breaks off talks with inspectors. Continues to refuse inspection.
1990: Tries to buy electronic components for bomb triggers from U.S. company.
1990: 70 to 80 high-explosive tests in North Korea of bomb components are reported by South Korean press.
1990: Tests large plutonium processing plant, showing it is operational.
1990: Starts up new plant to process uranium for reactor fuel.
1990: Continues to produce plutonium and process it into weapon-ready form.
1990: Successfully tests a Scud-C missile, hitting targets off North Korea's eastern coast from a base in the Kangwon Province; Iran reportedly tests what U.S. intelligence identifies as a North Korean version of the Scud-C.
1991: Refuses Japan's offer of aid and recognition in exchange for inspections.
1991: South Korea's Defense Minister states that South Korea may attack construction of the Yongbyon (50-Mwt.) reactor.
1991: Demands that South Korea give up U.S. nuclear protection.
1991: U.S. begins to remove nuclear weapons from South Korea.
1991: Continues to produce plutonium and process it into weapon-ready form.
1991: Sells nuclear-capable Scud-C missiles to Syria and Iran.
1991: North and South Korea agree to denuclearize the peninsula and not to produce, test, receive, deploy or possess nuclear weapon fuel or weapons, or the means to make it.Continues to refuse inspections.
1991-92: North Korea delivers an estimated 24 Scud-Cs and 20 mobile launchers to Syria, and ships additional Scuds to Syria through Iran.
1992: Promises to allow inspections of entire nuclear program by IAEA, as agreed in 1985.
1992: U.S. intelligence observes a truck hauling things away from a plutonium extraction plant.
1992: To show good will, U.S. and South Korea cancel military exercises.
1992: North Korea declares to IAEA that it has seven sites and about 90 grams of plutonium.
1992: In 5 trips, lets inspectors visit 7 declared sites.
1992: Buries, according to U.S. intelligence, first floor of two-story building, believed to contain waste from plutonium extraction.
1992: Continues to produce plutonium and process it into weapon-ready form.
1992: IAEA concludes there are inconsistencies in North Korea's nuclear declaration, and requests access to two additional sites at Yongbyon; North Korea denies access to one site and only visual access to the other.
1992: Russia reportedly prevents some 60 Russian rocket scientists from going to North Korea.
1992: The U.S. Department of State sanctions entities in North Korea, Iran and Syria for "missile technology proliferation activities."
1993: Inspectors ask to see two undeclared sites, on suspicion that secret plutonium processing will be revealed, and allow one month for compliance. U.S. aerial photographs and IAEA chemical analysis data confirm existence of a nuclear waste dump and inconsistencies in N. Korea's declaration of nuclear materials.
1993: Bars inspectors from undeclared sites and says that it will drop out of nonproliferation treaty. Inspectors declare North Korea has violated its obligations to open undeclared sites.
1993: Says U.N. sanctions would amount to a declaration of war.
1993: "Suspends" withdrawal from nonproliferation treaty but continues to bar inspectors from full inspection.
1993: President Clinton warns North Korea that using nuclear weapons against South Korea "will be the end of their country as they know it."
1993: Restricts inspectors to working at night by flashlight. A North Korean defector describes underground missile launch pads.
1993: Repudiates the nonproliferation treaty; breaks off talks with inspectors. Inspectors say their data is "damaged" and "deteriorating."
1993: Breaks off denuclearization talks with South Korea. President Clinton warns North Korea that it "cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb," and that "any attack on South Korea is an attack on the United States."
1993: IAEA reports to UN that if IAEA inspectors are not permitted to revisit North Korea's nuclear facilities, they can no longer verify the IAEA/North Korea safeguards agreement.
1993: North Korean diplomat is expelled from Moscow for trying to hire Russian scientists.
1993: Offers to let inspectors into only 5 of 7 declared sites, barring them from the 30-Mwt. reactor, the plutonium processing plant and two undeclared sites. Inspectors say their cameras no longer work.
1993: U.S. intelligence says North Korea has a "better than even" chance of possessing one or two bombs.
1993: Manufactures fuel for its 200-Mwt. reactor.
1993: Continues to produce plutonium.
1993: North Korea successfully tests the Nodong missile to a range of about 500km.
1994: Agrees to one-time inspection of all seven declared sites, but balks at procedures.
1994: CIA Director says he believes North Korea may have produced one or two nuclear bombs.
1994: Agrees to inspection procedures but delays inspectors' visas and continues to bar inspectors from undeclared sites. Threatens to leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if U.S. sends Patriot anti-missile batteries to South Korea.
1994: Inspectors find seals broken, are denied access to crucial equipment and cannot certify North Korean compliance.
1994: IAEA terminates inspections after North Korea bars inspectors from collecting samples at its plutonium reprocessing plant.
1994: U.S. cancels scheduled talks.
1994: IAEA announces again that it can no longer ensure that North Korea's nuclear materials were not being diverted for nonpeaceful purposes.
1994: North Korea begins removing spent fuel from the 5 Mwt. reactor, in "serious violation" of North Korea's safeguard agreement with IAEA. U.S. offers to hold high-level talks. IAEA reports that it is quickly losing ability to monitor past production of plutonium.
1994: IAEA tells UN Security Council that North Korea's recent removal of fuel rods makes it impossible to reconstruct the operating history of the reactor.
1994: IAEA exempts North Korea from technical assistance; North Korea reacts by quitting IAEA.
1994: U.S. announces it will pursue global economic sanctions against North Korea if North Korea does not allow IAEA inspectors to examine the spent fuel rods.
1994: U.S. builds up its troops in South Korea and announces it will begin consultations with other countries regarding sanctions.
1994: Former President Carter visits North Korea; Kim Il Sung offers to freeze North Korea's nuclear program in return for high-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea. U.S. offers to resume high-level talks and suspends efforts to sanction North Korea.
1994: U.S. begins negotiations with North Korea on freezing North Korea's nuclear program. Kim Il Sung dies; talks are suspended.
1994: U.S. and North Korea issue an "Agreed Statement,"under which North Korea will rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in exchange for light-water reactors, interim energy supplies and normalization of political and economic relations.
1994: U.S. and North Korea conclude an "Agreed Framework," in which President Clinton promises to help arrange, finance and construct the light-water reactors and fund interim energy supplies.
1994: North Korea announces that it has halted construction on its two unfinished graphite-moderated reactors.
1994: Chinese President Jiang Zemin promises the U.S. that China will strongly support the U.S.-North Korea agreement.
1994: IAEA inspectors confirm North Korea has frozen its nuclear program and stopped construction on the unfinished reactors.
1994: U.S. helicopter strays over North Korea and is shot down; one pilot is killed, Bobby Hall is taken prisoner and released 13 days later.
1995: Russia sends a delegation to Pyongyang to persuade North Korea to use Russian atomic reactors.
1995: Secretary of State Warren Christopher estimates to Congress that U.S. share of the deal with North Korea would be $20-30 million per year over a decade or more.
1995: U.S., Japan and South Korea establish the KEDO consortium.
1995: KEDO announces it will provide North Korea with two South Korean-manufactured lightwater reactors.
1995: CIA Director John Deutch estimates that the Nodong-1 missile will be deployed by the end of 1996, and that North Korea is continuing missile research and work on nuclear, chemical and biological warheads.
1995: KEDO and North Korea reach an agreement on the supply of two light-water reactors, worth $4.5 billion, financed primarily by South Korea and Japan.
1995: According to comments by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Iran has received four Scud TELs from North Korea.
1996: U.S. intelligence reportedly voices increased concern about North Korea's success in securing sensitive technology for its Nodong missile program.
1996: North Korea announces it will no longer respect the demilitarized zone and holds military exercises there for three days.
1996: A North Korean submarine, believed to be spying, runs aground off the coast of South Korea.
1996: North Korea announces it will withhold from the IAEA any new nuclear information until the light-water reactors are finished and operating, a period of 10 years or more.
1996: South Korea delays progress on the Agreed Framework in reaction to the submarine incident.
1996: North Korea reportedly obtains European-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
1996: China joins the UN Security Council in criticizing North Korea and expressing "serious concern" about the submarine incident.
1996: North Korea reportedly is set to test fire a Nodong-1 ballistic missile capable of reaching Japan.
1996: South Korea demands a formal apology from North Korea for the submarine incident.
1996: North Korea apologizes to South Korea for the September submarine incident, and promises to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents in the future.
1996: North Korea agrees to face-to-face talks with South Korea and the United States on the possibility of negotiating a formal end to the Korean War.
1996: The United States and North Korea begin bilateral talks on how to curb North Korea's missile exports and freeze its missile development.
1996: Taiwanese Customs officials reportedly seize 200 barrels (15 tons) of ammonium perchlorate on a North Korean freighter bound for Pakistan's SUPARCO (Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission).
1997: Top North Korean theoretician and close adviser to Kim Jong Il defects to South Korea.
April 1997: A South Korean newspaper publishes an essay written by a high-ranking North Korean defector, in which he implies that North Korea has nuclear weapons and the ability to use them against South Korea and Japan.
August 1997: Construction begins on two light-water nuclear reactors being built in North Korea as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States.
May 1998: Unhappy about the slow pace of activity under the Agreed Framework, it is reported that North Korea may reopen the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.
June 1998: North Korea declares that it will continue to develop and export nuclear-capable missiles.
July 1998: The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that North Korea is refusing to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors full access to its nuclear sites.
July 1998: Negotiators from the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the consortium building the two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea under the 1994 Agreed Framework, reach a tentative agreement on sharing the cost of the construction.
August 1998: U.S. intelligence reports that North Korea is building a large underground facility that may be either a nuclear reactor or reprocessing plant.
March 1999: A U.S. Department of Energy intelligence report claims that North Korea is working on uranium enrichment techniques.
May 1999: A team of American nuclear specialists arrives in North Korea to begin an inspection of what is suspected of being an underground nuclear weapons site at Kumchangri.
July 1999: A U.S. intelligence report claims that North Korea has between 25 and 30 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, enough to make several nuclear warheads.
January 2000: It is reported that the Congo may be supplying North Korea with uranium in return for military training of its government forces.
February 2000: Two loans totalling $4.2 billion are made available to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to build two nuclear reactors in North Korea. Although the project is still short $400 million, preparatory work is moving ahead.
June 2000: In the wake of a historic summit between the leaders of North and South Korea, the Clinton administration formally implements steps to ease economic sanctions against North Korea.
October 2000: The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assesses that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons.
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India
1948: India establishes an Atomic Energy Commission for exploration for uranium ore.
1953: President Eisenhower launches ``Atoms for Peace'' program, offering access to exchange atomic technology for pledges to use it for civilian use, not weapons.
1954: Head of India's AEC, rejects safeguards, oversight by new International Atomic Energy Agency.
1956: India completes negotiations to build 40 megawatt ``Canadian-Indian Reactor, U.S.'' research reactor. United States supplies heavy water, used to control nuclear fission.
1958: India begins designing and acquiring equipment for its own Trombay plutonium reprocessing facility, giving the nation a dual-use capability that could lead to atomic weapons.
1959: U.S. trains Indian scientists in reprocessing, handling plutonium.
1963: Two 210-megawatt boiling-water reactors are ordered for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station from General Electric. United States and India agree plutonium from India's reactors will not be used for research for atomic weapons or for military purposes.
1964: First plutonium reprocessing plant operates at Trombay.
1965: Chairman of India's AEC proposes subterranean nuclear explosion project. China, one of five declared nuclear states, detonates first atomic explosive device. U.S. withdraws military aid from India after the India-Pakistan War.
1966: India declares it can produce nuclear weapons within 18 months.
1968: Non-Proliferation Treaty completed. India refuses to sign.
1969: France agrees to help India develop breeder reactors.
1974: India tests a device of up to 15 kilotons and calls the test a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.'' Canada suspends nuclear cooperation. The United States allows continued supply of nuclear fuel, but later cuts it off.
1976: Soviet Union assumes role of India's main supplier of heavy water. Canada formally halts nuclear cooperation.
Early 1980s: India acquires and develops centrifuge technology, builds uranium enrichment plants at Trombay and Mysore.
1991: India enters agreement with Pakistan prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear installations, a measure to ease tensions.
1992: Rare Metals Plant at Mysore begins producing enriched uranium. Nuclear Suppliers Group, organization of nations with nuclear materials, stops supplying India.
1997: India announces development of supercomputer technology that can be used to test nuclear-weapon designs. Fuel reprocessing plant at Kalpakkam, a large-scale plutonium separation facility, completes ``cold commissioning'' in last phase of pre-operating trials.
1998: India announces plans to sign deal with Russia for two 1 000 megawatt nuclear reactors.
May 11-13: India conducts five underground nuclear tests, declares itself a nuclear state.
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Pakistan
1972: Following its third war with India, Pakistan secretly decides to start nuclear weapons program to match India's developing capability. Canada supplies reactor for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, heavy water and heavy-water production facility.
1974: Western suppliers embargo nuclear exports to Pakistan after India's first test of a nuclear device.
1975: Purchasing of components and technology for Kahuta uranium-enrichment centrifuge facility begins after return of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, German-trained metallurgist who takes over nuclear program.
1976: Canada stops supplying nuclear fuel for Karachi.
1977: German seller provides vacuum pumps, equipment for uranium enrichment. Britain sells Pakistan 30 high-frequency inverters for controlling centrifuge speeds. United States halts economic and military aid over Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program.
1978: France cancels deal to supply plutonium reprocessing plant at Chasma.
1979: United States imposes economic sanctions after Pakistan is caught importing equipment for uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta.
1981: Smuggler arrested at U.S. airport while attempting to ship two tons of zirconium to Pakistan. Nevertheless, Reagan administration lifts sanctions and begins generous military and financial aid because of Pakistani help to Afghan rebels battling Soviets.
1983: China reportedly supplies Pakistan with bomb design. U.S. intelligence believes Pakistani centrifuge program intended to produce material for nuclear weapons.
1985: Congress passes Pressler amendment, requiring economic sanctions unless White House certifies that Pakistan is not embarked on nuclear weapons program. Islamabad is certified every year until 1990.
1986: Pakistan, China sign pact on peaceful use of nuclear energy, including design, construction, operation of reactors.
1987: Pakistan acquires tritium purification and production facility from West Germany.
1989: A 27-kilowatt research reactor is built with Chinese help and comes under international monitoring.
1990: Fearing new war with India, Pakistan makes cores for several nuclear weapons. Bush administration, under Pressler amendment, imposes economic, military sanctions against Pakistan.
1991: Pakistan puts ceiling on size of its weapons-grade uranium stockpile. It enters into agreement with India, prohibiting the two states from attacking each other's nuclear installations.
1993: Report by the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute says about 14,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges installed in Pakistan. German customs officials seize about 1,000 gas centrifuges bound for Pakistan.
1996: Pakistan buys 5,000 ring magnets from China to be used in gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. China tells U.S. government it will stop helping Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Islamabad completes 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor that, once operational, could provide the first source of plutonium-bearing spent fuel free from international inspections.
1998: Reacting to fresh nuclear testing by India, Pakistan conducts its own atomic explosions.
