Contrary to the State Supreme Court’s ruling, we hold that 25 U. S. C. §1912(f )—which bars involuntary termination of a parent’s rights in the absence of a heightened showing that serious harm to the Indian child is likely to result from the parent’s “continued custody” of the child—does not apply when, as here, the relevant parent never had custody of the child. We further hold that §1912(d)—which conditions involuntary termination of parental rights with respect to an Indian child on a showing that remedial efforts have been made to prevent the “breakup of the Indian family”—is inapplicable when, as here, the parent abandoned the Indian child before birth and never had custody of the child. Finally, we clarify that §1915(a),which provides placement preferences for the adoption of Indian children, does not bar a non-Indian family like Adoptive Couple from adopting an Indian child when no other eligible candidates have sought to adopt the child.We accordingly reverse the South Carolina Supreme Court

Beginning its reading with the last clause of §1912(f ),the majority concludes that a single phrase appearing there—“continued custody”—means that the entirety ofthe subsection is inapplicable to any parent, however committed, who has not previously had physical or legal custody of his child. Working back to front, the majority then concludes that §1912(d), tainted by its association with §1912(f ), is also inapplicable; in the majority’s view,a family bond that does not take custodial form is not a family bond worth preserving from “breakup.” Because there are apparently no limits on the contaminating power of this single phrase, the majority does not stop there. Under its reading, §1903(9), which makes biological fathers “parent[s]” under this federal statute (and where,again, the phrase “continued custody” does not appear),has substantive force only when a birth father has physical or state-recognized legal custody of his daughter.When it excludes noncustodial biological fathers from the Act’s substantive protections, this textually backward reading misapprehends ICWA’s structure and scope. Moreover, notwithstanding the majority’s focus on the per- ceived parental shortcomings of Birth Father, its Beginning its reading with the last clause of §1912(f ),the majority concludes that a single phrase appearing there—“continued custody”—means that the entirety ofthe subsection is inapplicable to any parent, however committed, who has not previously had physical or legal custody of his child. Working back to front, the majoritythen concludes that §1912(d), tainted by its associationwith §1912(f ), is also inapplicable; in the majority’s view,a family bond that does not take custodial form is not afamily bond worth preserving from “breakup.” Because there are apparently no limits on the contaminating power of this single phrase, the majority does not stop there. Under its reading, §1903(9), which makes biological fathers “parent[s]” under this federal statute (and where,again, the phrase “continued custody” does not appear),has substantive force only when a birth father has physical or state-recognized legal custody of his daughter.When it excludes noncustodial biological fathers from the Act’s substantive protections, this textually backward reading misapprehends ICWA’s structure and scope. Moreover, notwithstanding the majority’s focus on the per- ceived parental shortcomings of Birth Father, its reaBeginning its reading with the last clause of §1912(f ),the majority concludes that a single phrase appearing there—“continued custody”—means that the entirety ofthe subsection is inapplicable to any parent, however committed, who has not previously had physical or legal custody of his child. Working back to front, the majoritythen concludes that §1912(d), tainted by its associationwith §1912(f ), is also inapplicable; in the majority’s view,a family bond that does not take custodial form is not afamily bond worth preserving from “breakup.” Because there are apparently no limits on the contaminating power of this single phrase, the majority does not stop there. Under its reading, §1903(9), which makes biological fathers “parent[s]” under this federal statute (and where,again, the phrase “continued custody” does not appear),has substantive force only when a birth father has physical or state-recognized legal custody of his daughter.When it excludes noncustodial biological fathers from the Act’s substantive protections, this textually backward reading misapprehends ICWA’s structure and scope. Moreover, notwithstanding the majority’s focus on the per- ceived parental shortcomings of Birth Father, its reaBeginning its reading with the last clause of §1912(f ),the majority concludes that a single phrase appearing there—“continued custody”—means that the entirety ofthe subsection is inapplicable to any parent, however committed, who has not previously had physical or legal custody of his child. Working back to front, the majoritythen concludes that §1912(d), tainted by its associationwith §1912(f ), is also inapplicable; in the majority’s view,a family bond that does not take custodial form is not afamily bond worth preserving from “breakup.” Because there are apparently no limits on the contaminating power of this single phrase, the majority does not stop there. Under its reading, §1903(9), which makes biological fathers “parent[s]” under this federal statute (and where,again, the phrase “continued custody” does not appear),has substantive force only when a birth father has physical or state-recognized legal custody of his daughter.When it excludes noncustodial biological fathers from the Act’s substantive protections, this textually backward reading misapprehends ICWA’s structure and scope. Moreover, notwithstanding the majority’s focus on the per-ceived parental shortcomings of Birth Father, its reasoning necessarily extends to all Indian parents who have never had custody of their children, no matter how fully those parents have embraced the financial and emotional responsibilities of parenting. The majority thereby transforms a statute that was intended to provide uniform federal standards for child custody proceedings involving Indian children and their biological parents into an illogical piecemeal scheme.

Consistent with these findings, Congress declared its purpose “to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federalstandards” applicable to child custody proceedings involving Indian children. §1902. Section 1903 then goes on toestablish the reach of these protections through its defi-nitional provisions. For present purposes, two of these definitions are crucial to understanding the statute’s full scope.
First, ICWA defines the term “parent” broadly to mean“any biological parent . . . of an Indian child or any In- dian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child.”§1903(9). It is undisputed that Baby Girl is an “Indian child” within the meaning of the statute, see §1903(4); ante, at 2, n. 1, and Birth Father consequently qualifiesas a “parent” under the Act.

of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
under State law shall satisfy the court that active
efforts have been made to provide remedial services
and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts
have proved unsuccessful.” (Emphasis added.)
In other words, subsection (d) requires that an attemptbe made to cure familial deficiencies before the drastic measures of foster care placement or termination of parental rights can be taken.
The majority would hold that the use of the phrase “breakup of the Indian family” in this subsection meansthat it does not apply where a birth father has not previously had custody of his child. Ante, at 12. But there is nothing about this capacious phrase that licenses such a narrowing construction. As the majority notes, “breakup” means “‘[t]he discontinuance of a relationship.’” Ante, at 12 (quoting American Heritage Dictionary 235 (3d ed.1992)). So far, all of §1912’s provisions expressly apply inactions aimed at terminating the “parent-child relationship” that exists between a birth father and his child, and they extend to it meaningful protections.

The majority, reaching the contrary conclusion, assertsbaldly that “when an Indian parent abandons an Indianchild prior to birth and that child has never been in theIndian parent’s legal or physical custody, there is no ‘relationship’ that would be ‘discontinu[ed]’ . . . by the termination of the Indian parent’s rights.” Ante, at 12. Says who? Certainly not the statute. Section 1903 recognizes Birth Father as Baby Girl’s “parent,” and, in conjunction withICWA’s other provisions, it further establishes that their“parent-child relationship” is protected under federal law.In the face of these broad definitions, the majority has no warrant to substitute its own policy views for Congress’ by saying that “no ‘relationship’” exists between Birth Father and Baby Girl simply because, based on the hotly con- tested facts of this case, it views their family bond as in- sufficiently substantial to deserve protection.

Ryan Padraza Comes Last is a full-blooded Indian, Sioux and Cheyenne on his father's side and Assiniboine on his mother's. He will soon receive his Lakota name: "A Rope." (Comes Last raises rodeo horses and always has a rope in his right hand. He likes to call Ryan his "right-hand man.") But despite his traditional roots and his Native heritage, Ryan may be one of the last of the Comes Last line allowed to enroll as a member of the Fort Peck Tribe.

According to the tribal Constitution, enrolled members must be at least one-quarter Assiniboine or Sioux, or a combination of the two. (Fort Peck is home to both groups, who share one government.) This method of measuring Native American ethnicity by percentage is known as the "blood quantum," and most Indian tribes use it to determine who can be admitted. A few use a different method, called "lineal descent," under which applicants need only prove they have an ancestor on the early tribal rolls. Before 1960, Fort Peck used lineal descent as well.