But one thing that has been consistently said, I think, is that it would be days before they knew whether it was a success. Crowing that it was working 12 hours later was clearly premature.

Cheers,
Scott.

http://www.pbs.org/n...dallen_05-24.html

ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant: First of all, let me tell you I have the highest regard for Secretary Salazar. We're great friends and he is a great mentor to me.

And I think, as far as stepping on the neck, obviously, that is a metaphor moving forward. There probably is a legal precedence to remove BP from this operation. But, as the federal on-scene coordinator and national incident commander, I wouldn't recommend it.

1) He has no business getting into the politics of "stepping on the neck". Salazar can speak for himself.

JEFFREY BROWN: But that's I think what -- I think what is confusing to people is to -- to -- you use a term like BP is the responsible party. And then we hear the tough talk about pushing them aside. So, can you just clarify, who is, in fact, in charge of all this?

ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN: The response is being run by the federal on-scene coordinator. Currently, that's Mary Landry, who is headquartered in Robert, Louisiana. She works directly for me as the national incident commander.

I'm reportable and accountable to Secretary Napolitano and the president. I would tell you, I understand Secretary Salazar's frustration. We talk all the time about this. And there is no difference between us on keeping pressure on BP.

We can -- we probably could legally do something else about the status of BP. All I'm saying is, as the national incident commander, I wouldn't contemplate making that recommendation at this time.

JEFFREY BROWN: Is the federal government in fact dependent on BP because of the technical requirements and the resources?

ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN: Well, I'm not sure dependent is the right word. The private sector is involved in this drilling, and the government has an oversight responsible. But those capacities, those technologies are not replicated inside the federal government.

If you equate that to dependency, I suppose you could, but what it really is, is the fact that BP has the means to fix this problem, and they need to be held accountable to do it, but with proper oversight. And that's our job.

2) The US is running the response and he is reportable and accountable, but BP is the responsible party. BP is involved and has the equipment and the means to fix it and they need to be held accountable. But the US isn't dependent on them. The US's job is oversight. But the US is responsible.

Am I the only one who sees this as gobblty-gook?

Here and elsewhere, he spends too much time apologizing for BP and not addressing things like the following:

1) Most people understand that BP and Transocean have the equipment and the expertise to work on the BOP and the issues on the floor of the Gulf. Even though Scrips and others have deepwater subs, we are ultimately dependent on BP and companies like them to plug the well.

2) Most people don't understand why more isn't being done to keep the oil from fowling the beaches. And things like (based on news and blog reports):

a) Why aren't booms being placed properly?
b) Why are spill control supplies stacked up at staging areas for days or weeks without being used?
c) Why are fishermen who have been trained in skimming and booming and so forth not out doing the work?
d) Why is the Coast Guard saying that BP has to approve reporters access to areas?
e) Why has BP been able to control information like the oil and gas spill rate?
f) What's the full story on the dispersants that are being used?
g) What about the idea of using supertankers to suck up the oil before it disperses and hits the beaches? http://www.esquire.c...pertankers-051310

Almost all of these things seem to be a problem with crisis management. It's not in BP's interest to address these things quickly - their interest is to minimize the perceived problem and minimize their costs. The US should be good at this, and should step in.

Adm. Allen should be explaining things like that, not waiting for the press to ask the right questions. And not obfuscating the issue with lots of organizational chart jargon. The US should have a much stronger response in the area away from the sea floor while at the same time brainstorming ways to plug the well.

My $0.02.

Cheers,
Scott.

I agree that it makes sense to do those things, and things like be realistic about the scale of the problem to plan the response accordingly.

I saw something somewhere that said that BP's lawyers were running the communications. They're ultimately worried about the legal judgments against them, so doing things like using millions of gallons of detergents to keep the oil from coming on shore (even if there are very bad consequences) is a way to limit their liability. Downplaying the size helps to keep the ambulance chasers away, too, the thinking goes.

Maybe that's it.

But that's stupid because it's clear the problem is huge and isn't being adequately addressed. Happy talk isn't going to keep the oil off shore. It's much cheaper and better to keep the oil off shore than to scoop up and wash beaches and marshes...

Maybe it's the usual problem of poor communications in large organizations.

I agree that more needs to be known. Whatever the reason, the US needs to be more active.

FWIW.

Cheers,
Scott.

I'll not bite on the snark.

I don't have a problem with him granting the interview - that's appropriate and part of his job, but it's not a good reflection on the Coast Guard that he can't explain things clearly and avoid political landmines.

There's no way there's going to be a "no bid" contract for the cleanup. http://www.whitehous...tion_10272009.pdf (13 page .pdf). I suspect there will be pressure for lots of contracts to spread the work around. And BP will get the bill (they've said they'll pay for the cleanup - they're hedging on the economic damages ("legitimate claims")).

Cheers,
Scott.

http://www.army.mil/...-during-drawdown/

After consultations with Commanders in theater and extensive analysis, the U.S. Army has decided to continue base life support (BLS) services in Iraq under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III, rather than transitioning these services to LOGCAP IV. As a result, BLS in Iraq, which includes engineering and sustainment services, equipment maintenance, facility operations, food service, cleaning, laundry, water production, sewage and trash services, will continue to be provided by KBR.

This decision is based primarily on the assessment of Commanders that such a transition during the drawdown could have significant adverse operational impacts. Along with the return of U.S. military personnel, the drawdown in Iraq will involve the closure or transfer of 139 active bases and facilities; management of the 95,400 contractors currently in Iraq (of which 49,400 support the LOGCAP program); and the retrograde of over 2.9 million separate items. In addition to ensuring flexible, seamless and efficient support to the ground commanders, this decision was also based on a careful analysis of President Obama's Presidential Directive for Iraq Drawdown, GAO's concerns, an Army Business Case Analysis, Afghanistan Lessons Learned and estimated costs of transitioning.

Moreover, if the Army issued a task order for BLS to new contractors under LOGCAP IV, the transition would not be complete until February 2011 assuming prompt contract award without protest. The current timetable for the completion of the responsible drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq is December 2011.

This decision does not change the Army's determination to compete other task orders for contracted support in the CENTCOM AOR under LOGCAP IV and other contracts. Based on Task Orders awarded in the CENTCOM AOR, approximately 76% of all work will be transitioned to the LOGCAP IV contract. Additionally, the Army has taken other steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of contract support. Steps include: increased numbers of contracting officers, contracting officer representatives and subject matter experts overseeing contracts; reduced use of cash for local contract payment; command emphasis on contract administration management; stand-up of Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan; and management of and accounting for contractors in theater.

Dunno how much of that is spin, but we all know that there are appeals and protest processes for government contracts, so it seems reasonable...

Cheers,
Scott.
(Who thinks that private companies have no business doing this logistics stuff in a war zone, but there we are.)