F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities \ufffd rather than its declared nuclear sites \ufffd for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.
A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.
G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.
Plutonium isn't found (in reasonable quantities) in nature. It's formed in reactors via [link|http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plutonium-239|reactions with U238]. Since Iran [link|http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr.htm|doesn't have an operational reactor], it's reasonable to assume that several years will be required before enough plutonium is available for reprocessing. Then they'll have to figure out how to do it. This assumes that they'll have enough fuel of their own (not fuel donated by Russia that would have to be returned for reprocessing) - something that isn't a given.
H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.
Atomic bombs are 1940s technology. Any reasonably modern country can solve the problem if it's willing to invest the time and money to do so. This means, of course, that keeping the genies confined to [link|http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons|9 bottles] will become increasingly difficult without a change in thinking.