Isn't mass deployment automatically doomed?

I imagine the pilot schemes grabbed all the available ex-policemen and ex-customs officers in the area, who are graduates of criminology courses, have practical experience of undercover questioning, know the use and limitations of observation and that terrorists are rare. They know the public resentment of too many false positives and mostly pull in drug mules and gun toters. This is not new and just an extension of existing procedures.

What's new is trying to make this a scaled-up, nationwide deployment. How many talented, ex-policemen do you think are left? A bunch of min wage hacks, as you say. In the same way that only the talented should be allowed near a microphone, only the talented should be allowed to observe and detain. Therefore, isn't the TSA automatically creating a scaled-up, nationwide disaster that can't be fixed? Isn't this a doomed idea from the start?

Those who seek to do premeditated harm will almost always attack through weaknesses in the system. Concentrating on the big-10 airports won't be very effective in increasing the security of the system as a whole.

It's a tough problem (see below), but treating everyone as a potential suspect isn't going to make the system safer at an acceptable cost. I'm not advocating profiling - I'm advocating real methods that increase system security (many of which have already been implemented - stronger cabin doors, agents on planes, etc.).

Basically, by the time the "evil-doers" are at the airport, it's too late (as illustrated by the recent events in [link|http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/6257194.stm|Glasgow]). Physical security at airports is important, but attempting to divine intentions of people in a queue there is far too late in the process.

[link|http://www.addictinggames.com/airportsecurity.html|Airport Security] Shockwave game. :-/

Of course, [link|http://www.schneier.com/essay-163.html|data mining has lots of problems], too:

[...]

Used properly, data mining is a great tool. As a result of data mining, AT&T reduces the costs of cell phone fraud, Amazon.com shows me books I might want to buy, and Google shows me advertising I'm more likely to be interested in. But it only works when there's (1) a reasonable percentage of attacks per year, (2) a well-defined profile to search for, and (3) and a low cost of false alarms.

[...]

Terrorist plots are different. First, attacks are very rare. This means that even very accurate systems will be so flooded with false alarms that they will be useless: millions of false alarms for every one real attack, even assuming unrealistically accurate systems.

Let's look at some numbers. Assume an unrealistically optimistic system with a 1-in-100 false positive rate (99% accurate), and a 1-in-1,000 false negative rate (99.9% accurate). That is, while it will mistakenly classify something innocent as a terrorist plot one in a hundred times, it will only miss a real terrorist plot one in a thousand times. Assume one billion possible "plots" to sift through per year, about four per American citizen, and that there is one actual terrorist plot per year.

Even this unrealistically accurate system will generate 10 million false alarms for every real terrorist plot it uncovers. Every day of every year, the police will have to investigate 270,000 potential plots in order to find the one real terrorist plot per month.

[...]

FWIW.

Cheers,
Scott.

Post #291,089 by warmachine 8/18/07 1:10:10 PM Reply	Isn't mass deployment automatically doomed? I imagine the pilot schemes grabbed all the available ex-policemen and ex-customs officers in the area, who are graduates of criminology courses, have practical experience of undercover questioning, know the use and limitations of observation and that terrorists are rare. They know the public resentment of too many false positives and mostly pull in drug mules and gun toters. This is not new and just an extension of existing procedures. What's new is trying to make this a scaled-up, nationwide deployment. How many talented, ex-policemen do you think are left? A bunch of min wage hacks, as you say. In the same way that only the talented should be allowed near a microphone, only the talented should be allowed to observe and detain. Therefore, isn't the TSA automatically creating a scaled-up, nationwide disaster that can't be fixed? Isn't this a doomed idea from the start? Matthew Greet Choose Life. Choose a job. Choose a career. Choose a family. Choose a fucking big television, choose washing machines, cars, compact disc players and electrical tin openers. Choose good health, low cholesterol, and dental insurance. Choose fixed interest mortgage repayments. Choose a starter home. Choose your friends. Choose leisurewear and matching luggage. Choose DIY and wondering who the fuck you are on a Sunday morning. Choose sitting on that couch watching mind-numbing, spirit-crushing game shows, stuffing fucking junk food into your mouth. Choose rotting away at the end of it all, pishing your last in a miserable home, nothing more than an embarrassment to the selfish, fucked up brats you spawned to replace yourself. Choose your future. Choose life... But why would I want to do a thing like that? I chose not to choose life. I chose somethin' else. And the reasons? There are no reasons. Who needs reasons when you've got heroin? - Mark Renton, Trainspotting.
Post #291,091 by bepatient 8/18/07 1:43:14 PM Reply	I believe that was my point Its not "automatic"...but darned close. If they kept the specialists and focused on the top 10 int'l airports...they might be able to pull it off...but they'll probably put the best ones in Salina Ks airport. Too much of today's music is fashionable crap dressed as artistry._{Adrian Belew}
Post #291,093 by Another Scott 8/18/07 2:44:58 PM Reply	Some of the 9/11 folks started off in Portland, Maine. Those who seek to do premeditated harm will almost always attack through weaknesses in the system. Concentrating on the big-10 airports won't be very effective in increasing the security of the system as a whole. It's a tough problem (see below), but treating everyone as a potential suspect isn't going to make the system safer at an acceptable cost. I'm not advocating profiling - I'm advocating real methods that increase system security (many of which have already been implemented - stronger cabin doors, agents on planes, etc.). Basically, by the time the "evil-doers" are at the airport, it's too late (as illustrated by the recent events in [link\|http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/6257194.stm\|Glasgow]). Physical security at airports is important, but attempting to divine intentions of people in a queue there is far too late in the process. [link\|http://www.addictinggames.com/airportsecurity.html\|Airport Security] Shockwave game. :-/ Of course, [link\|http://www.schneier.com/essay-163.html\|data mining has lots of problems], too: [...] Used properly, data mining is a great tool. As a result of data mining, AT&T reduces the costs of cell phone fraud, Amazon.com shows me books I might want to buy, and Google shows me advertising I'm more likely to be interested in. But it only works when there's (1) a reasonable percentage of attacks per year, (2) a well-defined profile to search for, and (3) and a low cost of false alarms. [...] Terrorist plots are different. First, attacks are very rare. This means that even very accurate systems will be so flooded with false alarms that they will be useless: millions of false alarms for every one real attack, even assuming unrealistically accurate systems. Let's look at some numbers. Assume an unrealistically optimistic system with a 1-in-100 false positive rate (99% accurate), and a 1-in-1,000 false negative rate (99.9% accurate). That is, while it will mistakenly classify something innocent as a terrorist plot one in a hundred times, it will only miss a real terrorist plot one in a thousand times. Assume one billion possible "plots" to sift through per year, about four per American citizen, and that there is one actual terrorist plot per year. Even this unrealistically accurate system will generate 10 million false alarms for every real terrorist plot it uncovers. Every day of every year, the police will have to investigate 270,000 potential plots in order to find the one real terrorist plot per month. [...] FWIW. Cheers, Scott.
Post #291,092 by boxley 8/18/07 2:34:27 PM Reply	just sweep some mid level drug dealers off the street and put them to work, they can smell a wrong un a mile away :-) thanx, bill Quantum materiae materietur marmota monax si marmota monax materiam possit materiari? Any opinions expressed by me are mine alone, posted from my home computer, on my own time as a free american and do not reflect the opinions of any person or company that I have had professional relations with in the past 51 years. meep reach me at [link\|mailto:bill.oxley@cox.net\|mailto:bill.oxley@cox.net]

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