The developement of the Harrier was *filled* with problems.

It was "new tech" at the time, and had a lot of problems. Granted, this was sorted out mostly at the factory/early development. But not that greatly different (other than [the Osprey] being rushed into service) than the Osprey.

Show on TLC right now about it. First 2 years the Marines took delivery of Harriers there were no accidents - but the Marines were posting ONLY the best pilots to the Harriers (in Vietnam). When they started putting "regular" pilots in, they had 19 crashes in 8 years.

Just as a data point. :)

Addison

And I can't say its a *wrong* mindset, because there's some data points that would back it up.

Problem is with the military, is they're (no pun intended) on the cutting edge.

Engineers and designers want to get all the bugs out, the military wants something that works, and they can deal with some minor problems.

This has a lot of downsides, too. But for instance, while the T-26 Pershing was being ironed out, M-4 Shermans were being blown to hell in France. The Army was screaming for the heavy tank that could deal with Panzers one on one.

When you look at current military equipment - B-52s that were built in the 1950s (currently I don't believe there are any crewmen on the 52 fleet who were born when their plane was made), fighters designed in the 60s and built in the 70s, nuclear attack submarines built in the 60s and upgrades that made them more capable than their replacement straight out of drydock..... The military knows that they'll have (whatever) for a Looooooong time. The 688 attack boats - they're nothing like they were when they were first launched.

The current helicopters in the Marine arsenal have been heavily outfitted, changed, reconfigured.

Given that that *will* happen, why try to get a "perfect" design (especially considering the real bugs won't come out until later, or its under fire). Look at the 747. One spark in a gas tank.... In one plane, hundreds fly daily with the same "flaw".

Now, look at the problems that new procurement takes. Political opposition. Opposition from other branches (The A-10, prior to its shining example in Desert Storm, was facing opposition from internal to the Air Force, since it wasn't fast and shiny and didn't kill planes, AND the Army, because, By God, its not the Air Force's job to kill tanks).

Especially when congresscritters looking for home town pork can kill a weapons system that you deems as crucial (the Marine helicopters, I just heard today from a ex-Green Beret coworker are only able to be loaded to 60% of their specified capacity, due to their age and problems)... its easier to fix the system in the field.

[link|http://us.imdb.com/Title?0144550|The Pentagon Wars] showed this pretty well (though they went over the top in lampooning the Army General expressing this viewpoint). Gimme the system. We'll get it worked out. But we need it, first. If we don't get the ball rolling, procurement going, orders and stuff going, it will be YEARS in the red tape.

It gets back to a sort of guessing/gambling game.. which probability is more likely? The Marines are sent in with old equipment/aren't able to send support to Marines that need it in time, and lose $DEAD + $WOUNDED, or that there will be $DEAD + $WOUNDED in getting the Osprey operational?

Test it a bit longer, get the kinks out, THEN go for it. IMO.

How much longer? How many more kinks?

Someone made the decision that it was "good enough", that most of the big kinks were worked out, and they should start the ball rolling. You and I may disagree with them, but they did weigh that.

And they also factored in the problems that the military had, initially with the F-14, the Harrier, the M-16, etc. etc..

But when you're sucking down millions a month in "testing" - how much is "enough"?

Another part of the problem is that when you're "testing" you're in known scenarios, you tend to test what you expect. Its only when you get out of that, that you find what you didn't expect - like the latest crash, where apparently the software just wasn't programmed for the pilot doing exactly the right thing... Would "testing" have covered that eventuality? (I don't know, I'm still a bit foggy on exactly the problem there, and I have to guess the sim's don't have that problem).

Like I've said, I now understand the Osprey program, at least far better than I did before, with the problems its had.

I'd suggest thinking like you're in charge of a bunch of Marines. You're looking ahead to having to deploy them in combat.. Your helicopters are old, have lots of maintenance problems, and are slow. The vehicle that you can get to replace the helicopters is coming online.

Essentially, how much risk do you want to assign to your men? And don't forget - you're in the Marines - where sending a force to stop an enemy, and taking casualities is all part of the job... which one will cause LESS, in the end?

I agree they're rushing it. But I can somewhat understand why. (The coverup of the problems is what pisses me off about it. The Marines tell their guys that the Corp is always looking out for them, and its a lie, they've been hung out to dry by the top brass many times).

Addison

The problem with the Osprey, if I'm thinking about the same one as you, is related to the extreme diameter of the rotors and the aerodynamic effect of sharp turns while descending. Basically, the inboard rotor "stands still" while the plane executes a sharp turn around it, while the outboard rotor gains speed. With a single rotor there is no separation to induce the differential lift, and on the Harrier the thrust is not dependant on a horizontal rotation. The differential is not huge, but it's enough to increase the rate of roll -- a nasty feedback loop.

There's more than one. :)

Part of the problem, according to what I read, is the "fly-by-wire" system. Apparently all of this stuff is (supposed to be) automated, so the pilots don't have to worry with it. (Side effect, they can't override/change it)

Add to that that the systems are multiply redundant (complicating the software, isolating bad systems and deciding which systems to use, etc.

The aerodynamics of the bird I don't think are *that bad*. The civvie version apparently isn't having the problems, or else their software's got the problems compensated for.

So I don't know about that particular problem, its entirely possible - with a piston airplane, turning 2300 RPM, there's a HUGE pull to the side when you are angled up (thus increasing the lift on the prop coming "down" to the relative wind, and decreasing it to the "up" side).. A turn like that might end up with some problems similar. (I'd have thought the length of the mass arm would prevent it from doing that much).

I'd also think the Chinook would have had similar problems, and had most of them sorted out.......

Addison

Course, I'm sure the TROOPS love the A-10, they don't care WHO shoots the other tanks.

Its the Brass behind the scenes that worries about this shit.

There's more involved (agreement or law? limiting Army fixed wing aircraft to 10000 pounds), but that's the gist.

Yeah, there's something about that, When the AAC split off to the Air Force, they had an agreement of some kind that the Army (to prevent them from building another AAC) wouldn't have the sort of planes that the AF had.

Which is why the Army wants SuperCopters (which is all theirs, and they can do whatever they like), rather than begging support from the Air Force.

Addison