During the late 1970s until 1991, we maintained 16 division equivalents with 770,000 soldiers. This was an average of 48,000 soldiers per division. We now have 11 division equivalents on a real strength of 600,000. This is on average 54,000 troops per division. And this 600,000 number does not include the large active Guard/reserve cohort in the National Guard Bureau's structure and in the redundant parallel USAR bureaucracy.

Clearly, we did not improve our efficiency in the application of military manpower. Simply adding more money and manpower without fundamentally changing our methods will not yield any substantial increment in deployable combat forces. Mobilizing two more divisions would only yield six additional combat brigades at the best. Yet, this mobilization would require at least 110,000 more soldiers.

Including Special Operations Forces, let's assume the Army now has 35 maneuver brigade equivalents. The true number is lower because SOF is not that big and I included two armored cavalry regiments. And assume these brigades have 3,000 soldiers each. The real number here is far closer to 2,000 because: (a) battalions don't have 950 men each on the TOE and (b) virtually no battalions are being manned at 100 percent strength. But we'll ignore these practical factors. 35 x 3,000 = 105,000.

Question: Where are the other 500,000 troops and what are they doing? The nation deserves a soul-searching and honest answer by the Army, the Department of Defense and the Congress before it yields up one more soldier or one more penny of debt. This is something of rhetorical question because I know where they are. At least 50,000 are in the Military District of Washington. Vast numbers are being soaked up by USAREC, TRADOC and the personnel system practicing to re-enact the World War II mass mobilization. Tens of thousands more are sitting around Army Material Command shuffling paper and watching private contractors actually conduct material operations.