[link|http://denbeste.nu/cd_log_entries/2004/03/Structuralsolutions.shtml|From Stephen Den Beste]

Excerpts:
This is an example of two natural risks facing any democratic system, which are known as the tyranny of the majority and the tyranny of the minority. If the system goes all the way and gives full power to majority rule, then the majority may use the system to seriously infringe the rights of dissenting minorities, whether they be ethnic, religious, political or life-style. On the other hand, if the system goes too far in the direction of giving such minorities the ability to block governmental action, they can gain the power to extort concessions from the majority by paralyzing the system if they don't get what they want. Finding a balance between these two has always been difficult, and there is no ideal solution...

The Europeans tried to use a semantic solution: they directly addressed the issue and tried to solve it by explicitly allocating the number of seats among the states based on the political situation and population numbers as they exist now.

The American solution was structural; it did not directly address the issue, but rather set up a structure under which the issue ceased to be a threat to the system. It is inherent in a federal system that there will always be tension between large states and small states and there still is such tension, but the American system deals with that tension even though no one in 1787 could possibly have predicted which states would be big and which would be small. As of the 2000 census, the most populous state in the US is California and the least populous is Wyoming, neither of which even existed in 1787.

It isn't possible to completely avoid semantic solutions, and the US Constitution contains many. But in nearly every case they address eternal issues. (There are also certain clauses which deal with ratification and suchlike.)

...The primary problem here is designing a system which can be implemented and which will not destroy itself or become tyrannical. To even go into effect, it has to be approved by the Sunnis, the Kurds, the Shiites and the Americans (and British, but we're mainly driving this). The three Iraqi factions don't trust one another, and none of them totally trust the Americans or vice versa.

Of the four, the American demands were the most radical. The Iraqi constitution was required to guarantee the right of free expression, the principle of equal justice, the right of free exercise of religion, and the full and unconditional equality of women. It had to be democratic and it had to be secular. It had to establish an independent and impartial judiciary. It had to place all military power under civilian control. It absolutely could not fully and unconditionally incorporate Sharia as a body of law. If it did not satisfy the American demands, the Americans wouldn't approve it.

Bit within those considerable limits, those writing the Iraqi constitution also had to create a system acceptable to the three primary factions inside of Iraq. If they did not, the system would shake itself to pieces and there was a risk of Iraqi civil war.

The divisions within Iraq are very real. But this constitution takes advantage of the fact that there are three competing factions none of which really trusts the other. This constitution leverages that weakness, and makes it into a strength.