Controlling the highest ground (space now) militarily is the next big thing at the Pentagon; picking the commander in chief of the US Space Command for chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff would fit right in.

To tie in another thread, I suspect that wanting to build an anti-missile system, however (in)capable, is mostly a politically palatable means to another end, and the fact that MDI requires scrapping ABM and other non-militarization-of-space agreements is probably a desired side-effect rather than a liability.

A major criticism of the proposed antimissile system is that it does no good against a superpower unless it's impossibly perfect. One eurotational answer is that it is only intended to defend against "rogue nations" and terrorists; but it seems to leave intact the cheaper and simpler mass-destruction alternatives to ICBMs such lesser powers would probably choose anyway -- so why spend the money? A biological parallel: what good are half-evolved wings?

Broaden the POV a bit and a less spinnable outline delineates... A missile defense program requires a comprehensive and multifaceted space and ground system that includes killer real-time intelligence and super-precision aquisition and targetting of anything anywhere. Even an approximation of this is still quite a useful asset in a non-ABM role. By the time I build a system that can detect, verify, and shoot down a hostile ICBM launch even 50% of the time, chances are that I've also built the capability to follow and target individually small objects not only in the sky but on the ground. I might disable satellites and interdict replacement launches, track and eliminate conventional weapons even dispersed, destroy individual ships or aircraft anywhere commercial or military; I might even be able to zap any given high-level chinese functionary in his Mercedes literally with a bolt from the blue, after decoding his latest administrative orders.

Well, OK, that is a little fanciful, but you get the idea. In my view MDI is squarely aimed at keeping the US strategically on top vis-a-vis China in the next 50 years (other nuclear superpowers like the EC and Russia are not currently as uppity, and India isn't super -- of course, that could change).

In this partial-MDI-aimed-at-other-superpowers scenario, MAD is still vitally important as a deterrant. This is why I will not take MDI proponents and their denigration of MAD as "outdated" at face value until we actually and seriously reduce our own ICBM stockpile to levels insufficient to guarantee MAD -- which I don't see happening any time soon.

Giovanni