For the record, I did state pwc.
However, thank you for the link to the actual report.
Now...details from the actual report. I note with interest that they blame the power problem is California on the lack of an enery policy. No comment is made to those currently facing criminal charges for wirefraud in the creation of the California energy crisis.
Further, Iraq is specifically mentioned. Although plans, policies and coalitions are mentioned, what is not mentioned is a method to enforce said plans, policies and coalitions. (Hint: there is only one way to enforce them.)
(Emphasis added.)
[...]
Now, the consequences of not having an energy policy that can satisfy our energy requirements on a sustainable basis have revealed themselves in California.
[...]
Over the past year, Iraq has effectively become a swing producer, turning its taps
on and off when it has felt such action was in its strategic interest to do so. (Page 39)
[...]
e. Review policies toward Iraq with the aim to lowering anti-Americanism in the Middle East and elsewhere, and set the groundwork to eventually ease Iraqi oilfield investment restrictions. Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to U.S. allies in the Middle East, as well as to regional and global order, and to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East. Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets. This would display his personal power, enhance his image as a \ufffdPan Arab\ufffd leader supporting the Palestinians against Israel, and pressure others for a lifting of economic sanctions against his regime.
The United States should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and political/diplomatic assessments. The United States should then develop an integrated strategy with key allies in Europe and Asia and with key countries in the Middle East to restate the goals with respect to Iraqi policy and to restore a cohesive coalition of key allies. Goals should be designed in a realistic fashion, and they should be clearly and consistently stated and defended to revive U.S. credibility on this issue. Actions and policies to promote these goals should endeavor to enhance the well-being of the Iraqi people.
Sanctions that are not effective should be phased out and replaced with highly focused and enforced sanctions that target the regime\ufffds ability to maintain and acquire weapons of mass destruction. A new plan of action should be developed to use diplomatic and other means to support U.N. Security Council efforts to build a strong arms-control regime to stem the flow of arms and controlled substances into Iraq. Policy should rebuild coalition cooperation on this issue, while emphasizing the common interest in security. This issue of arms sales to Iraq should be brought near the top of the agenda for dialogue with China and Russia.
Once an arms-control program is in place, the United States could consider reducing restrictions on oil investments inside Iraq. Like it or not, Iraqi reserves represent a major asset that can quickly add capacity to world oil markets and inject a more competitive tenor to oil trade. However, such a policy will be quite costly as this trade-off will encourage Saddam Hussein to boast of his \ufffdvictory\ufffd against the United States, fuel his ambitions, and potentially strengthen his regime. Once so encouraged and if his access to oil revenues were to be increased by adjustments in oil sanctions, Saddam Hussein could be a greater security threat to U.S. allies in the region if weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sanctions, weapons regimes, and the coalition against him are not strengthened. Still, the maintenance of continued oil sanctions is becoming increasingly difficult to implement. Moreover, Saddam Hussein has many means of gaining revenues, and the sanctions regime helps perpetuate his lock on the country\ufffds economy. (Page 42)
