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CERT\ufffd Advisory CA-2002-30 Trojan Horse tcpdump and libpcap Distributions
Original issue date: November 13, 2002
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC

A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
Overview

The CERT/CC has received reports that several of the released source code distributions of the libpcap and tcpdump packages were modified by an intruder and contain a Trojan horse.

We strongly encourage sites that use, redistribute, or mirror the libpcap or tcpdump packages to immediately verify the integrity of their distribution.
I. Description

The CERT/CC has received reports that some copies of the source code for libpcap, a packet acquisition library, and tcpdump, a network sniffer, have been modified by an intruder and contain a Trojan horse.

The following distributions were modified to include the malicious code:
tcpdump
md5sum 3a1c2dd3471486f9c7df87029bf2f1e9 tcpdump-3.6.2.tar.gz

md5sum 3c410d8434e63fb3931fe77328e4dd88 tcpdump-3.7.1.tar.gz
libpcap
md5sum 73ba7af963aff7c9e23fa1308a793dca libpcap-0.7.1.tar.gz

These modified distributions began to appear in downloads from the HTTP server www.tcpdump.org on or around Nov 11 2002 10:14:00 GMT. The tcpdump development team disabled download of the distributions containing the Trojan horse on Nov 13 2002 15:05:19 GMT. However, the availability of these distributions from mirror sites is unknown. At this time, it does not appear that related projects such as WinPcap and WinDump contain this Trojan horse.

The Trojan horse version of the tcpdump source code distribution contains malicious code that is run when the software is compiled. This code, executed from the tcpdump configure script, will attempt to connect (via wget, lynx, or fetch) to port 80/tcp on a fixed hostname in order to download a shell script named services. In turn, this downloaded shell script is executed to generate a C file (conftes.c), which is subsequently compiled and run.

When executed, conftes.c makes an outbound connection to a fixed IP address (corresponding to the fixed hostname used in the configure script) on port 1963/tcp and reads a single byte. Three possible values for this downloaded byte are checked, each causing conftes.c to respond in different ways:

* 'A' will cause the Trojan horse to exit
* 'D' will cause the Trojan to fork itself, spawn a shell, and redirect this shell to the connected IP address (Note that communication to and from this shell is obfuscated by XORing all bytes with the constant 0x89.)
* 'M' will cause the Trojan horse to close the connection and sleep for 3600 seconds

To mask the activity of this Trojan horse in tcpdump, libpcap, the underlying packet-capture library of tcpdump, has been modified (gencode.c) to explicitly ignore all traffic on port 1963 (i.e., a BPF expression of "not port 1963").
II. Impact

An intruder operating from (or able to impersonate) the remote address specified in the malicious code could gain unauthorized remote access to any host that compiled a version of tcpdump with this Trojan horse. The privilege level under which this malicious code would be executed would be that of the user who compiled the source code.
III. Solution

We encourage sites using libpcap and tcpdump to verify the authenticity of their distribution, regardless of where it was obtained.
Where to get libpcap and tcpdump

While the compromise of these distributions is being investigated, the tcpdump and libpcap maintainers recommend using the following distribution sites:

[link|http://sourceforge.net/projects/tcpdump/|http://sourceforge.net/projects/tcpdump/] [link|http://sourceforge.net/projects/libpcap/|http://sourceforge.net/projects/libpcap/]

Sites that mirror the source code are encouraged to verify the integrity of their sources. We also encourage users to inspect any and all other software that may have been downloaded from the compromised site. Note that it is not sufficient to rely on the timestamps or sizes of the file when trying to determine whether or not you have a copy of the Trojan horse version.
Verifying checksums

The MD5 hashes of the vendor suggested updates for libpcap and tcpdump are as follows:
tcpdump
md5sum 03e5eac68c65b7e6ce8da03b0b0b225e tcpdump-3.7.1.tar.gz
libpcap
md5sum 0597c23e3496a5c108097b2a0f1bd0c7 libpcap-0.7.1.tar.gz

As a matter of good security practice, the CERT/CC encourages users to verify, whenever possible, the integrity of downloaded software. For more information, see

[link|http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-2001-06.html|http://www.cert.org/...s/IN-2001-06.html]
Appendix A. - Vendor Information

This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments.

Conectiva
We have checked all our released libpcap and tcpdump packages and confirmed that they do not contain the trojan code.

Debian
Problematic packages are only distributed in Debian/unstable. I have examined both source packages and they did not contain the trojan code the HLUG reported on their web page. Hence, I guess that Debian distributes safe source.

MontaVista Software, Inc.
We have examined our sources, and our software does not contain this trojan. We are not vulnerable to this advisory.

SuSE
SuSE Linux products are not vulnerable.

Feedback can be directed to the author: Roman Danyliw, Chad Dougherty.
This document is available from: [link|http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-30.html|http://www.cert.org/...s/CA-2002-30.html]
CERT/CC Contact Information

Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.

CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
Using encryption

We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from

[link|http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key|http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key]

If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information.
Getting security information

CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site

[link|http://www.cert.org/|http://www.cert.org/]

To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your message

subscribe cert-advisory

* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University.

Revision History

November 13, 2002: Initial rel

Post #62,998 by Yendor 11/15/02 4:50:41 AM Reply	Can't read this... Been trying for 2 days. Can't reach cert.org. What's it say? -YendorMike [link\|http://www.hope-ride.org/\|http://www.hope-ride.org/]
Post #63,009 by Silverlock 11/15/02 8:54:33 AM Reply	Here ya go CERT\ufffd Advisory CA-2002-30 Trojan Horse tcpdump and libpcap Distributions Original issue date: November 13, 2002 Last revised: -- Source: CERT/CC A complete revision history is at the end of this file. Overview The CERT/CC has received reports that several of the released source code distributions of the libpcap and tcpdump packages were modified by an intruder and contain a Trojan horse. We strongly encourage sites that use, redistribute, or mirror the libpcap or tcpdump packages to immediately verify the integrity of their distribution. I. Description The CERT/CC has received reports that some copies of the source code for libpcap, a packet acquisition library, and tcpdump, a network sniffer, have been modified by an intruder and contain a Trojan horse. The following distributions were modified to include the malicious code: tcpdump md5sum 3a1c2dd3471486f9c7df87029bf2f1e9 tcpdump-3.6.2.tar.gz md5sum 3c410d8434e63fb3931fe77328e4dd88 tcpdump-3.7.1.tar.gz libpcap md5sum 73ba7af963aff7c9e23fa1308a793dca libpcap-0.7.1.tar.gz These modified distributions began to appear in downloads from the HTTP server www.tcpdump.org on or around Nov 11 2002 10:14:00 GMT. The tcpdump development team disabled download of the distributions containing the Trojan horse on Nov 13 2002 15:05:19 GMT. However, the availability of these distributions from mirror sites is unknown. At this time, it does not appear that related projects such as WinPcap and WinDump contain this Trojan horse. The Trojan horse version of the tcpdump source code distribution contains malicious code that is run when the software is compiled. This code, executed from the tcpdump configure script, will attempt to connect (via wget, lynx, or fetch) to port 80/tcp on a fixed hostname in order to download a shell script named services. In turn, this downloaded shell script is executed to generate a C file (conftes.c), which is subsequently compiled and run. When executed, conftes.c makes an outbound connection to a fixed IP address (corresponding to the fixed hostname used in the configure script) on port 1963/tcp and reads a single byte. Three possible values for this downloaded byte are checked, each causing conftes.c to respond in different ways: * 'A' will cause the Trojan horse to exit * 'D' will cause the Trojan to fork itself, spawn a shell, and redirect this shell to the connected IP address (Note that communication to and from this shell is obfuscated by XORing all bytes with the constant 0x89.) * 'M' will cause the Trojan horse to close the connection and sleep for 3600 seconds To mask the activity of this Trojan horse in tcpdump, libpcap, the underlying packet-capture library of tcpdump, has been modified (gencode.c) to explicitly ignore all traffic on port 1963 (i.e., a BPF expression of "not port 1963"). II. Impact An intruder operating from (or able to impersonate) the remote address specified in the malicious code could gain unauthorized remote access to any host that compiled a version of tcpdump with this Trojan horse. The privilege level under which this malicious code would be executed would be that of the user who compiled the source code. III. Solution We encourage sites using libpcap and tcpdump to verify the authenticity of their distribution, regardless of where it was obtained. Where to get libpcap and tcpdump While the compromise of these distributions is being investigated, the tcpdump and libpcap maintainers recommend using the following distribution sites: [link\|http://sourceforge.net/projects/tcpdump/\|http://sourceforge.net/projects/tcpdump/] [link\|http://sourceforge.net/projects/libpcap/\|http://sourceforge.net/projects/libpcap/] Sites that mirror the source code are encouraged to verify the integrity of their sources. We also encourage users to inspect any and all other software that may have been downloaded from the compromised site. Note that it is not sufficient to rely on the timestamps or sizes of the file when trying to determine whether or not you have a copy of the Trojan horse version. Verifying checksums The MD5 hashes of the vendor suggested updates for libpcap and tcpdump are as follows: tcpdump md5sum 03e5eac68c65b7e6ce8da03b0b0b225e tcpdump-3.7.1.tar.gz libpcap md5sum 0597c23e3496a5c108097b2a0f1bd0c7 libpcap-0.7.1.tar.gz As a matter of good security practice, the CERT/CC encourages users to verify, whenever possible, the integrity of downloaded software. For more information, see [link\|http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-2001-06.html\|http://www.cert.org/...s/IN-2001-06.html] Appendix A. - Vendor Information This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments. Conectiva We have checked all our released libpcap and tcpdump packages and confirmed that they do not contain the trojan code. Debian Problematic packages are only distributed in Debian/unstable. I have examined both source packages and they did not contain the trojan code the HLUG reported on their web page. Hence, I guess that Debian distributes safe source. MontaVista Software, Inc. We have examined our sources, and our software does not contain this trojan. We are not vulnerable to this advisory. SuSE SuSE Linux products are not vulnerable. Feedback can be directed to the author: Roman Danyliw, Chad Dougherty. This document is available from: [link\|http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-30.html\|http://www.cert.org/...s/CA-2002-30.html] CERT/CC Contact Information Email: cert@cert.org Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 U.S.A. CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from [link\|http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key\|http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key] If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information. Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site [link\|http://www.cert.org/\|http://www.cert.org/] To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your message subscribe cert-advisory * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University. Revision History November 13, 2002: Initial rel
Post #63,017 by Yendor 11/15/02 10:05:35 AM Reply	Thanks! -YendorMike [link\|http://www.hope-ride.org/\|http://www.hope-ride.org/]

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