https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/business/boeing-737-accidents.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage
NTSB pressured their Dutch counterpart to not release a report putting a good chunk of the blame for the 2009 Turkish Airlines flight 1951 crash with Boeing. This one involved a 737-800. Similar to the current MCAS debacle, the faulty system relied on a single, known to be dodgy, sensor. Booing tried to slap a software fix on the broken hardware, but, taking a cue from the cell cos, patches were only distributed for newer airframes.
And...
NTSB pressured their Dutch counterpart to not release a report putting a good chunk of the blame for the 2009 Turkish Airlines flight 1951 crash with Boeing. This one involved a 737-800. Similar to the current MCAS debacle, the faulty system relied on a single, known to be dodgy, sensor. Booing tried to slap a software fix on the broken hardware, but, taking a cue from the cell cos, patches were only distributed for newer airframes.
And...
Joe Sedor, the National Transportation Safety Board official who led the American team working on the Turkish Airlines investigation, said it was not unusual for investigating bodies to make changes to a report after receiving feedback, or for American safety officials to jointly submit their comments with Boeing.
Mr. Sedor is now overseeing the N.T.S.B.’s work on the Max crashes. He acknowledged that reliance on a single sensor was a contributing factor in both cases but cautioned against focusing on it.