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New IT.-related [Boeing]: re s/ware bug + bad pointer veils actual cause + Addendum "How To Run 2.5 yrs:
..with never a 'QDR'" == their syn. for a Bug.

Via WaPo.

1 day ago
My background is in software development and system administration, not aviation, and my development area was specifically telecommunications (writing software that administered setup changes on telecom switches/exchanges). As this involved inventing new, unusual technology in the DSL (domain specific language) realm that depended on an advanced understanding of the host servers' processing of program/function modules and run-time treatment of object code, I became intimately familiar with diagnosing ways software can be plagued by programming errors that ocasionally lead to dormant bugs.

I'll give an example. You code a function call that involves using a tricky pointer construction to pass a data value. Done correctly, this kind of setup allocates a place in memory to hold the data being passed and a location reference (the pointer) through which the data can be accessed. In some programming environments, a commonly-made mistake is bungling the way the pointer is created, leaving it pointing not to the intended data-holding element(s) but instead to an incorrect memory location whose contents and their nature and usage are unknown. This is a kind of "wild pointer".

If you're lucky, your wild pointer will corrupt vital data during testing, leading to detectable and traceable errors. But programs in executable (machine-language) form always contain "wasteland" space that's not actually being used. If your wild pointer corrupts something there, the code using it may appear to work normally - sometimes for years. But then one day, something (a recompilation, for example) can cause the arrangement of things in the executable to shift around, and you may suddenly be corrupting not waste space but something vital.

When I hear that a suspected bad sensor is thought to have supplied a faulty value, as a veteran "bitsmith" I have to wonder whether a good sensor value hasn't been hosed by a program bug.

[. . .]
And, BTW, yes, guys, this can happen in Ada-based avionics software.

[. . .]
1 day ago
...or it may just be Boeing's sensor supplier failed to do adaquate Q.A.

[. . .]
1 day ago
I hope the angle-of-attack sensor data supplied directly by the sensor is something that can be recovered from the FDR and correlated timewise with the other flight data. If the data show level- or nose-down readings being "corrected" by the avionics system attempting to pull out of a perceived stall threat by lowering the nose, I would strongly suspect corruption of the sensor's value in memory by a software bug.

As a programmer, I would want a series of memory dumps, but I have no idea whether that sort of thing has become a standard part of what the "black" box equipment does. If not, it really should be.

And the human pilots should be able to more practicably override the software if they suspect it's gone off its rocker.

Hey! ..even moi can grok this scenario--what Think ye? Pro bit-mongers.. ...

PS: this IT-guy is from Denmark.. do they teach-em-up more bettah, There?
(My personal experience of a few from there prettty much confirms that .. they are at very least a Fuck of a Lot SANER than our fellow inmates here in the dis- though sanity may well not be a large requirement to do digital confabulations (right?) er, that's a query--not a snark. Well not exactly.. ;^>

Edit: Addendum:

1 day ago
A colleague and I once programmed, tested, delivered and installed a 6,000-line software package involving several hundred "tricky pointer" uses of the kind my example mentions. This doesn't sound like much until you realize that the code was ultra-compact because it literally had no ordinary variables. It comprised a compiler, virtual machine, and administration utility handling all item-specific data elements via elaborately-structured data tables maintained by our software's users, who were telecom switching engineers. Our QA (test) people declined to test it, citing its monumental level of complexity. So aside from our client company's cursory checks (we actually created "their" data tables for them), the whole package went into production as was. It ran for 2½ years and was never "QDR'd" (found to have a bug).

There are clear reasons why this seemingly "risky" piece of code behaved itself, and they had to do with how it was designed, laid out in code, and tested. I can still remember some important points:

- Complexity that could be encapsulated in clean (though sometimes complicated) data structures was, minimizing procedural code lines, and making testing more certain.

- I wrote a 50+ page code-level test script as I wrote the code and exhaustively carried it out. Every conceivable "boundary condition" (e.g., array [sub-]dimension limit) was identified and tested.

- The code itself was intentionally visually laid out for rational proofreading and systematic testing.

- "Risky" stuff like potentially confusing pointer usages was verified, for each type of case, to be producing correct object code and the code formats were catalogued into a finite set of approved patterns.

- No operation with the potential to overrun a data structure went unchecked.

- Sanity checks were programmed to detect "impossible" logic errors (but none ever did).

This is the real-world way to make software as close to error-free as possible. Alas, it seems to be seldom used!

'Course, however critical this app. there's not likely to be Dead People if it were to fail (unless thousands of automatic-sent Emergency Heads-Up calls got delayed.. and like that.) Have we gots folk who spawn such as his example: in very many places? {Alan Turing died and stuff..)
Expand Edited by Ashton March 17, 2019, 05:02:31 PM EDT
Expand Edited by Ashton March 17, 2019, 10:40:42 PM EDT
New Unrolled Trevor Sumner thread.

A good, quick, read.

tl;dr - it's not a software problem, it's a system problem.

(via Cheryl Rofer's Twitter feed.)

New Just now, too: AXIOS gives a 'cubic-closest-packing'/incisive Summary of the 'issues' (an hour ago)
Axios plus several al punte links.
(Sure beats looking for original-Gems within the litany of "replies" to each new pronouncement!)

It seems though--already--that, the Special Drumpf-infected DEAL via which this *NEW* model made a lateral arabesque around ALL the usual training/Simulator preludes to airworthiness-Cert of ANY NEW MODEL, via the transparently-iffy rubric, "we just made a few improvements": shall become the root basis for $$$n-B successful suits, assuredly already in Legal prep ... worldwide.

Secondarily: the blithe PRESUMPTION that "pilots don't NEED TO KNOW (even that this fly-by-wire feature exists)", added to such facts as: the dis-U.S. FAA, run like all the other directorates by a TEMP-employee and for the obvious reason that EVERY slot (of the few even-yet 'filled' by Drumpf): is either manifestly incompetent or actively-biased via ties to the industry-to-be regulated:

Just might get the political-aspect finally MADE CLEAR via the 300+ dead-normal-ordinary People: all resulting from the end-run around sanity: of this ludicrous Drumpf-like deal given. Boeing (er, The Art of the Deal writ large? again.)

Natch my Hope is: that this random confluence of events can only intensify the Spotlight on--just how destructively-MUCH the Orange rasPutin has damaged the entire 'Murican position worldwide--and down to local 'school boards' options, etc. etc. A fitting memorial to those needlessly-dead might just be: that their sacrifice could prove to have been one of those tipping-point things of such consequence as: accelerating even planetary matters towards ---> sanity... (surely the 'Real' 'Muricn Dream--if the perps could actually cogitate at all?)

Fingers crossed ..it's a veritable long-shot re that hymn, Sleepers Awake! innit?
(This is becoming fascinating re the What-If?s generated so early-on), ergo the Possibilities -->
New Won't matter
It wasn't "300+ dead-normal-ordinary People" that died. It was 300+ brown people. Totally different thing.

New not really drumpf's fault he was not president in 2011
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts" – Richard Feynman
New Regulation is only part of the FAA's mandate.
It also includes "Encouraging and developing civil aeronautics, including new aviation technology." These two things are often in conflict.

It's mourning in America again.
New Re: On LionAir, pilots were never even told about the MCAS
I am by no means a professional pilot, but it seems to me a bit ridiculous for any pilot to sit in the left (or right) seat of a new airplane and *not* comprehensively review the panel. During my primary flight training, I flew three different aircraft with distinctly different panels and equipment. I sat in the seat of those three aircraft for a long time figuring out where everything was and what the new stuff (gps system was present in one) before I ever started the engine. Mind you, these were very basic small aircraft with comparatively trivial instruments and systems aboard.

For the 737Max, there are new "cut-out switches" plainly visible in the panel. Are we to believe that these pilots looked at those switches, didn't know what they were and didn't bother to find out? That doesn't strike me as remotely believable. But, Trump is our president and that's about as easy to comprehend, I suppose.

It's mourning in America again.
New You posted a pic of that module.. which prompted moi to stare at it for some. time.
{while pondering the Significance of what 'skipping-over its exact capabilities' ..means for us all, on a much larger Scale} Ugly, that.

WHY did none of these Pros *demand exact and full DISCLOSURE* of the reason for this module AND all-about-its-guts (??) My first Q on peeping the module: is it conceivable that those about to fly their first MAX would NOT ask selves Query 1: w.t.f.does it Do, and HOW does it Do it? Second: What might it.. do-Rong??? and how do I *fully* disable it --> (once I get Query 1 answered).

(And I'd bet a C-note that None Of These newbies *guessed, from the idiot-iPad-Intro: just how Incessantly the sucker would re-ENGAGE INDEFINITELY: after Five Fucking Seconds!
* because, as now we know: NONE of the newest pilots of this machine were told that the System Existed, let alone its dependence on ONE sensor, the idiot-fact that: in these repeated 5-second stabs: the vertical elevator would increment DOWN all-the-way.

And even moi can deduce that the jackscrew moves that sucker s l o w l y ..so that even if a brilliant pilot grokked what was happening: (and had already run out of UP-correction via the much smaller trim-tabs): The Plane had NO CHANCE because turning that screw back to ^UP^ ... would take more time than the takeoff altitudes attained (already dangerously decreased from porpoising via the ferocity of each cumulative NOSE-down update! to the jackscrew).

Methinks that the Chief Engineer in this project just might be liable for criminal charges: for the absurdities already discovered, the secrecy of the MCAS system and the failure to demand triple-redundancy within a logic-choice so inescapably fatal (if any of a number of steps malfunctioned.)

I ain't no genius: if I could out-Think the tribe of Boeing's engineers, at first-glance! as each new factoid emerged: THAT IS SCARY re. all those geese within that spam-in-a-can coffin-in-waiting ..for a bad transistor.
THIS-all is on the same scale of IGNORANCE as got us the short-fingered-vulgarian and his gaggle of fellow mobsters. (So what are the ODDS?? that this banana-republic shall ever ACT-proportionally to the PERIL re climate ..until way past Tipping-Point #2, 3 arrive.) {don't answer that}

That a savvy org. like Boeing can push this FUBAR into --> sales-to-Users sans more than ONE simulator then in existence! ... seems the leitmotif re the ODDS on so unprecedented a matter as CLIMATE: being judged/funded by a Congress, Judiciary. Liar-in-Chief ... within which groups (I'd bet another C-note or two) ~90% of the members have no idea what Ohm's Law is, why it matters in so many places etc. Never mind Mr. Ohm---these folk are often both illiterate in science and most 'Muricans remain innumerate in all things. We Learn ever-so-slowly; thence we Act glacially. A q.e.d. death-knell. ie Ask-not what you can do for your planet ..launch an IPO.

I no longer stress the little-grey-cells, imagineering [n+1] possible ways that an accelerated DROP-PETROLEUM methodology might succeed (worst of all: we COULD actually have all that success==MONEY antediluvian reptilian-$$baggage) ... while saving our asses too. And I'll be damned if I shall 'become depressed' over: what surely is {some form of} Cosmic Decision that: this species is too deadly to Every Life Form.. to be allowed to continue. I shall simply meditate upon such WISDOM as is--apparently forever--beyond 'our' ken.

..works por moi.:-)
(too much Mahler ..doesn't really create endorphins though) :-/
New NewYorker article gets it right re. techno and the legal investigation(s) in transit
NYer How Did the F.A.A. Allow the Boeing 737 Max to Fly?

Early on, employees of the F.A.A. and Boeing decided how to divide up the certification work. But, partway through the process, a former F.A.A. safety engineer told the Seattle Times, “we were asked by management to re-evaluate what would be delegated. Management thought we had retained too much at the FAA.” The engineer said that “there was constant pressure to re-evaluate our initial decisions,” and “even after we had reassessed it … there was continued discussion by management about delegating even more items down to the Boeing Company.”

Even the work that was retained, such as reviewing technical documents provided by Boeing, was sometimes curtailed. “There wasn’t a complete and proper review of the documents,” the former engineer added. “Review was rushed to reach certain certification dates.”

The new revelations don’t stop there. “Federal prosecutors and Department of Transportation officials are scrutinizing the development of Boeing Co.’s 737 MAX jetliners,” the Wall Street Journal reported on Monday. “A grand jury in Washington, D.C., issued a broad subpoena dated March 11 to at least one person involved in the 737 MAX’s development, seeking related documents, including correspondence, emails and other messages,” a source told the paper. (The Justice Department and Department of Transportation declined to comment on the Journal’s reporting.)

The criminal investigation began well before the crash of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight. It’s not clear yet whether it is focussing on the mcas system, the report in the Journal said. But, that article added, “In the U.S., it is highly unusual for federal prosecutors to investigate details of regulatory approval of commercial aircraft designs, or to use a criminal probe to delve into dealings between the FAA and the largest aircraft manufacturer the agency oversees. Probes of airliner programs or alleged lapses in federal safety oversight typically are handled as civil cases, often by the DOT inspector general.”

Does this not strongly suggest [the knee-jerk scenario as instantly comes to mind] I mean ..strongly:

CIEIO at apex of the driving force:

"We must get something out there SOONEST ..or Airbus/neo shall clean our clocks: Get ON IT!!"
If allegations from the smaller-fish alleged above check out, could any jury omit the depravity of re-re-revising work already done (especially about the ordered massive lateral arabesque around the already ovine, "let Boeing do it.." attitude of FAA) in delegating so much 'oversight': of which they wanted even less.. ...

tl;dr ... The hurrier I go the behinder I get..
(A #1 al punte comment to moi ..when I was {unapothegmatically?) trying to er, accelerate the calibration of some accelerator gadgetry du jour, needed toot-sweet (and yes I acknowledged that his riposte Wins.)

Methinks this summarizes the Proximate Cause of two plane-loads of dead people via a possibly unCertifiable [??] product thence shipped ..all unDocumented with huge WARNINGS about what the {undisclosed} Key Culprit COULD DO: this oversight premeditated secrecy surely will be the McGuffin within a barrage of worldwide Claims against such a hideously ill-managed 'roll-out', wherein the MAIN impetus violates, "Good Fast Cheap: pick any two." Is jail-time next in the offing?

"We'll See.."
New But "Bidness is SO much better at *EVERYTHING* than Government Bureacrats", no?

It's mourning in America again.
New They fought MCAS "more than two dozen times" and it never occurred to them to turn it off?
Once? Okay. Twice? Er, maybe. Thrice? TURN IT OFF!

Emphasis Mine
(CNN) - An off-duty pilot in the cockpit of a Boeing 737 Max 8 jet jumped in to help crew disable a malfunctioning flight-control system as it experienced difficulties in October, according to Bloomberg.

The next day, with a different crew, the same plane crashed into the sea off Jakarta, killing all 189 people on board. ...

A preliminary KNKT report said the crew of Air Lion Flight 610 struggled to override the plane's automatic systems in the minutes before it plunged into the ocean. The system pulled the plane's nose down more than two dozen times, the report said.

The report said the MCAS system was responding to incorrect data transmitted by an AOA sensor. A different flight crew experienced the same issue on a flight from Denpasar to Jakarta the previous day, but had turned off the MCAS and took manual control of the plane, the report said.


Again, I'm not apologizing for Boeing. This was obviously a piss poor system design. But, and this is a crucial but, the system itself was not responsible for these aircraft incidents.

It's mourning in America again.
New I don't follow that conclusion.
Any system that requires you to know how to turn it off so it doesn't kill you and your passengers is at fault if someone fails to turn it off and it kills you and your passengers.

If the system wasn't faulty, they wouldn't have died. Hence responsibility. It's the root cause of the accident, not the pilots' failure to turn it off.

In other words, you don't fix a system like this by training people to turn it off. That's papering over the problem. You fix it by making sure it doesn't kill people either way.

Only if it's not possible to fix it and it's saving more people than it's killing, but if that's the solution then the root cause is the poor aerodynamics of the plane in the first place.

This is pretty basic RCA.
Welcome to Rivendell, Mr. Anderson.
New Read the FARs.
It's the pilot who has the final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety of the flight.

I think our disagreement here is really the different attitudes we have about tech in general. You love it. I don't trust it and think, overall, it is a net negative on society.

It's mourning in America again.
New Every plane ever made is 100% tech

New Also: vaccines for preventable childhood diseases that are otherwise miserably fatal
Tech all the way.
New Should have been more clear: Information Technology (i.e. computers and software)

It's mourning in America again.
New Which are used to design all of these wonders of the modern age.
Welcome to Rivendell, Mr. Anderson.
New Meh.

As the Lion Air crew fought to control their diving Boeing Co. 737 Max 8, they got help from an unexpected source: an off-duty pilot who happened to be riding in the cockpit.

That extra pilot, who was seated in the cockpit jumpseat, correctly diagnosed the problem and told the crew how to disable a malfunctioning flight-control system and save the plane, according to two people familiar with Indonesia’s investigation.

The next day, under command of a different crew facing what investigators said was an identical malfunction, the jetliner crashed into the Java Sea killing all 189 aboard.

The previously undisclosed detail on the earlier Lion Air flight represents a new clue in the mystery of how some 737 Max pilots faced with the malfunction have been able to avert disaster while the others lost control of their planes and crashed. The presence of a third pilot in the cockpit wasn’t contained in Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee’s Nov. 28 report on the crash and hasn’t previously been reported.

The so-called dead-head pilot on the flight from Bali to Jakarta told the crew to cut power to the motor in the trim system that was driving the nose down, according to the people familiar, part of a checklist that all pilots are required to memorize.

By contrast, the crew on the flight that crashed the next day didn’t know how to respond to the malfunction, said one of the people familiar with the plane’s cockpit voice recorder recovered as part of the investigation. They can be heard checking their quick reference handbook, a summary of how to handle unusual or emergency situations, in the minutes before they crashed, Reuters reported, citing people it didn’t name.

Lion Air spokesman Danang Prihantoro declined to comment on the role of a third pilot, saying, “All the data and information that we have on the flight and the aircraft have been submitted to the Indonesian NTSC. We can’t provide additional comment at this stage due the ongoing investigation on the accident.”

The Indonesia safety committee report said the plane had had multiple failures on previous flights and hadn’t been properly repaired.

Airline mechanics tried four times to fix related issues on the plane starting Oct. 26, according to the Indonesia preliminary report. After pilots reported issues with incorrect display of speeds and altitude in the two prior flights, workers in Denspasar, Bali, replaced a key sensor that is used by the Boeing plane to drive down its nose if it senses an emergency.

Flight data shows the sensor, called the “angle of attack” vane, which measures whether air is flowing parallel to the length of the fuselage or at an angle, was providing inaccurate readings after that.

However, the pilots on the harrowing Oct. 28 flight from Bali to Jakarta didn’t mention key issues with the flight after they landed, according to the report.

Their request for maintenance didn’t mention they had been getting a stall warning since about 400 feet after takeoff as a result of the faulty angle-of-attack sensor. It was still giving false readings the next morning on the flight that crashed, according to flight data.


After the Lion Air crash, two U.S. pilots’ unions said the potential risks of the system, known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, hadn’t been sufficiently spelled out in their manuals or training. None of the documentation for the Max aircraft included an explanation, the union leaders said.

“We don’t like that we weren’t notified,’’ Jon Weaks, president of the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association, said in November. “It makes us question, ‘Is that everything, guys?’ I would hope there are no more surprises out there.’’

The Allied Pilots Association union at American Airlines Group Inc. also said details about the system weren’t included in the documentation about the plane.

Following the Lion Air crash, the FAA required Boeing to notify airlines about the system and Boeing sent a bulletin to all customers flying the Max reminding them how to disable it in an emergency.

Why Indonesian Plane Crash Has Led to U.S. Lawsuits: QuickTake

Authorities have released few details about Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 other than it flew a “very similar” track as the Lion Air planes and then dove sharply into the ground. There have been no reports of maintenance issues with the Ethiopian Airlines plane before its crash.

If the same issue is also found to have helped bring down Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, one of the most vexing questions crash investigators and aviation safety consultants are asking is why the pilots on that flight didn’t perform the checklist that disables the system.

“After this horrific Lion Air accident, you’d think that everyone flying this airplane would know that’s how you turn this off,” said Steve Wallace, the former director of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s accident investigation branch.

The combination of factors required to bring down a plane in these circumstances suggests other issues may also have occurred in the Ethiopia crash, said Jeffrey Guzzetti, who also directed accident investigations at FAA and is now a consultant.

“It’s simply implausible that this MCAS deficiency by itself can down a modern jetliner with a trained crew,” Guzzetti said.

MCAS is driven by a single angle-of-attack sensor near the nose even though there are two of the sensors on the plane. Boeing is planning to alter the system to rely on both sensors to reduce the chances of a malfunction.

These crashes were the result of a systemic problem at Boeing - they wanted to sell the Max 8 as a simple update of the 737 when it wasn't. Saying "the pilot is always responsible" is a cop-out in something as complex as a plane like the Max 8.


New "Airline mechanics tried four times since Oct. 26" says it all: how Know they had Fixed it, then?
And .. did these Repairers have the plane flown just after each? ANY? of these--thus: RECURRENT ERRORS.
(My lore says that repair mechanics Don't Fly-their-repair); but Pilots COULD. Why is this not mandatory re a repair tag which underscores that "the aircraft was in PERIL" Also, I believe a catch-phrase in the basic design of every 'system' == mandates placing any such malfunction at the top of the Risk-List, signifying "triple-redundancy design" is mandated (or words to that effect).

Thanks for snaring this al punte evidence that: The previous experiences with pilots--of THAT airline--were clearly NOT passed-on (at all? or so concisely as to MISS the points learned?) As above, an after-repair flight, preferably after receiving the full-notes of that "third pilot" would have revealed that: their 'fix' did NOT repair/did not return the plane to safe 'service' ... but with only two/informed people aboard who would have been at risk. And this costs--THAT airline--some $$Quatloos.

Once Twice again, human perfidy--failure to adequately disclose--seems by itself--to be (another definition of 'root) cause of the chain of events.

If the full story of this-all fails to shake-up the "FAA"s of every country (and too: the fly-by-wire aficonadoes: hey we can save$$/hire bus-drivers) then: MONEY will still Rulez-over (all these lessons) Or is that a foregone conclusion (?)
New It is definitely not a "cop out". Them's the rules and every pilot knows it.

It's mourning in America again.
New Somehow I don't think that the pilots are going to get the lion's share of the blame in these cases.
New heh. You don't know the FAA.

It's mourning in America again.
New Reuters today.

Much like tapping the brake pedal in a car to disengage cruise control, a sharp tug on the controls of older models of Boeing Co’s 737 used to shut off an automatic trim system that keeps the plane flying level, giving the pilot control.

But Boeing disabled the “yoke jerk” function when it brought out the 737 MAX, the latest version of its top-selling jet — and many pilots were unaware of the change, aviation experts told Reuters.

The difference may help explain why pilots struggled to keep their aircraft climbing after takeoff on two fatal 737 MAX flights less than five months apart that killed 346 people.


Yeah, sure, it's the pilots' fault.... Not.


Boeing made a conscious decision to sell the MAX 8 as a simple evolution of the 737 so that the FAA wouldn't require extra training, certifications, etc., that a "new" plane would require. Boeing's management decisions killed hundreds of people.

Not the pilots.

New I'll make you a bet.
I don't really disagree with your conclusions. Boeing screwed the pooch in a cynical effort to bring more value to the shareholders and avoid losing market share to Airbus. But, keeping in mind what the regulations say are the pilot's responsibilities and my own limited experience with the FAA and the NTSB, I'll wager that in roughly two years time when the NTSB submits its final report, there will be a "Probable Cause and Findings" section that reads, roughly, something like ...

The pilot's failure to maintain pitch control during take-off causing the aircraft to impact the ground/sea. Contributing to the incident was the pilot's unfamiliarity with the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, specifically how to disable the system when it began to operate in manner not designed.

Want to bet?

It's mourning in America again.
Expand Edited by mmoffitt March 25, 2019, 11:01:59 AM EDT
New Naah. We'll see.
New ..think that: *THIS* time, there's been far too much Ink properly flung
When the very fact of MCAS' existence is kept hidden--that plus the end-run around 'IT'S A NEW PLANE': to throw in pilot error should get them laughed-off, ultimately perhaps leading to an authentic re-do of the FAA --> on down (?) Even the vox populi (those interested) have surprisingly often gotten the simple logic Rite (!)

(Yeah, of course: any sane process outcome would be as shocking as Drumpf acknowledging--same courage-level as Shrub--mistakes were made).

George Carlin, Kurt V., Jonathan Swift ... wtf are? you when...
New The FAA's mission is schizophrenic.
Half their responsibility is regulation and safety. The other half is promoting aviation. In practice, they're largely cheerleaders for and defenders of the airlines.

It's mourning in America again.
New So promotion is the goal, safety is a tactic

New Yes, of course, Polly.

It's mourning in America again.
New ..as Murican as cyanide-laced *Apple Pie, innit?
..with a Smiley-face in whipped-cream on top ... (I can see it now!)

ADVERTISING, the entrepreneur's perpetual-propaganda. It has infected us all, by osmosis even from from the tyke days' exposure to radio jingles.. ...

"Rinso™ -- WHITE! then, next: IVORY™ -- 99 and 44/100 percent pure! It Floats!
SEE: after n-decades ... that inculcated crap finds a gaggle of neurons and *permanently*-makes 'em, UNerasable!

Rest case: Murica lurves its special brand of early-on Brainwashing.
(Even before The Cheney Shogunate made such torture minuscule compared to ITS agenda)

ULP! ... Jeez, if I'd spawned a successor or three decades ago: I might have.. {??} had the foresight to shield them from this premeditated mind-rot-via-jingles ... might. have. crap shoot That foresight..

Now with Intarweb 24/7/365: all-the-shit in ALL the homo-sap egregor: is permanently available to the tiniest (child/adult) minds ..forming THEIR-mindsets.
Only Hope I ken: is that *brian-research shall enable us all to ackshully ERASE stuff from those murdered synapses 'n such..
* including our Own oTpys iwithn the mix :-)
New More from Reuters.

SINGAPORE (Reuters) - U.S. and European regulators knew at least two years before a Lion Air crash that the usual method for controlling the Boeing 737 MAX’s nose angle might not work in conditions similar to those in two recent disasters, a document shows.

The European Aviation and Space Agency (EASA) certified the plane as safe in part because it said additional procedures and training would “clearly explain” to pilots the “unusual” situations in which they would need to manipulate a rarely used manual wheel to control, or “trim,” the plane’s angle.

Those situations, however, were not listed in the flight manual, according to a copy from American Airlines seen by Reuters.

The undated EASA certification document, available online, was issued in February 2016, an agency spokesman said.

It specifically noted that at speeds greater than 230 knots (265mph, 425kph) with flaps retracted, pilots might have to use the wheel in the cockpit’s center console rather than an electric thumb switch on the control yoke.

EASA and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ultimately determined that set-up was safe enough for the plane to be certified, with the European agency citing training plans and the relative rarity of conditions requiring the trim wheel.

In the deadly Lion Air crash in October, the pilots lost control after initially countering the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a new automated anti-stall feature that was pushing the nose down based on data from a faulty sensor, according to a preliminary report from Indonesian investigators released in November.

The flight conditions were similar to those described in the EASA document, a source at Lion Air said. The source said that training materials before the crash did not say the wheel could be required under those conditions but that Boeing advised the airline about it after the crash.

Boeing declined to comment on the EASA document or its advice to Lion Air, citing the ongoing investigation into the crash.

Ethiopia’s Transport Ministry, France’s BEA air accident authority and the FAA have all pointed to similarities between the Lion Air crash and an Ethiopian Airlines disaster this month. But safety officials stress that the Ethiopian investigation is at an early stage.


The crashes have also heightened scrutiny of the certification and pilot training for the latest model of Boeing Co’s best-selling workhorse narrowbody, now grounded globally.

In the EASA document, the regulator said simulations showed the electric thumb switches could not keep the 737 MAX properly trimmed under certain conditions, including those of the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes, according to the Indonesian preliminary report and a source with knowledge of the Ethiopian air traffic control recordings.


(Emphasis added.)

It wasn't the pilots' fault.

New Um, yeah, it kinda was.
The words "the pilots lost control" in your post is very telling. I maintain that will be the primary cause of the accident in the final report. I'll eat my hat if something like, "The pilot failed to maintain proper pitch attitude during take-off" isn't in the final report.

I'm as disappointed and angry at Boeing as you (or anyone else). It sickens me that their concern for their shareholders caused them to break with their long tradition of building their aircraft in such a way that their pilots could always fly them; and instead adopted the widely popular, fatally flawed position that "tech is better at everything" that Airbus has always held.

It's mourning in America again.
New ?
1) Root cause is different than responsibility by fiat.

2) Next time I get an MRI I'll wiggle a toe for you.
Welcome to Rivendell, Mr. Anderson.
New Did I even mention "root cause"? No. I did not.
What I did say:
Again, I'm not apologizing for Boeing. This was obviously a piss poor system design. But, and this is a crucial but, the system itself was not responsible for these aircraft incidents.

If I had to identify a "root cause" I would say the obvious, "The root cause of the accident was over reliance upon tech and under reliance upon piloting skills."

It's mourning in America again.
New so how do you feel about self driving tractor trailers? :-)
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts" – Richard Feynman
New Have those all you want. After I'm dead. ;0)

It's mourning in America again.
New Then be more clear with what you're saying.
Because that's how that reads when you're talking to people who aren't pilots and don't live the FARs.
Welcome to Rivendell, Mr. Anderson.
New This logic is impeccable. Or I ain't got no cuth at all. Thanks for Beautiful concision!
btw /me lurves Root Cause Analysis ... it may be the shortest TLA with the LARGEST importance, as it encapsulates the Aim--> of every after-accident program. Or that 'investigation' is pure unfumigated shit. (Being a 'technologist' never DID mean that: you must turn-off your lifetime of experience) ..nor eschew re-Framing [hate that word] of what it is you {increasingly suspect} is approaching Root, as you burrow down your own check-list.

aka Seiberling discovered the vulcanizing-effect upon (natural) rubber, when he accidentally spilled some on a stove. Archimedes-in-bathtub etc. Winners both.

New More more from Reuters

SEATTLE/PARIS/ADDIS ABABA (Reuters) - Boeing anti-stall software repeatedly forced down the nose of a doomed Ethiopian jet after pilots had turned it off, sources told Reuters, as investigators scrutinize the role played by technology and crew in the fatal March 10 crash.

A preliminary Ethiopian report into the disaster is due to be published within days and may include evidence the software system kicked in as many as four times before the 737 MAX dived into the ground, two people with knowledge of the matter said.

The software known as MCAS is at the center of accident probes in both the crash of Ethiopian flight 302 and a Lion Air accident in Indonesia five months earlier that together killed 346 people.

It was not immediately clear whether the Ethiopian crew chose to re-deploy the system, which pushes the Boeing 737 MAX downwards to avoid stalling. But one of the sources said investigators were studying the possibility that the software started working again without human intervention. A Boeing spokeswoman declined to comment. Ethiopian investigators were not available for comment.


(Emphasis added.)


New If this turns out to be true...
then the 737 Max is a fricking Airbus with a Boeing logo!

Which, I suppose shouldn't really surprise me. After all, Boeing is based in the same country that made billionaire heroes out of all the "tech giant geniuses" and technology is *always* great. Anyone who thinks human skill is worth anything is just an old school Luddite.

It's mourning in America again.
New Boeing has taken responsibility for both crashes now
Welcome to Rivendell, Mr. Anderson.
New BS
Listen hard to that video.

Basically he is STILL blaming pilots saying MCAS is adding to their workload, not saying its failure is killing people. He is saying if the pilots were faster they'd still be alive.

MCAS Should have 3 sensors. If they disagree, let them vote. If 2 match, use the information. If not, turn system off and alarm the hell out of the cockpit.

This is simple. This is CHEAP. Systems that can kill people should FAILSAFE. Always check the goddamn data!
New That's the part I don't get
They say that it isn't safety critical. Okay, so it doesn't need to be there, that's fine.

But as soon as you put something on the plane that can steer it, it damn well *makes* it safety critical.

New Yeah...
He's scared to death of lawsuits, so he's making mouth noises like he's taking responsibility, but he's not.

     IT.-related [Boeing]: re s/ware bug + bad pointer veils actual cause + Addendum "How To Run 2.5 yrs: - (Ashton) - (43)
         Unrolled Trevor Sumner thread. - (Another Scott) - (6)
             Just now, too: AXIOS gives a 'cubic-closest-packing'/incisive Summary of the 'issues' (an hour ago) - (Ashton) - (3)
                 Won't matter - (drook)
                 not really drumpf's fault he was not president in 2011 - (boxley)
                 Regulation is only part of the FAA's mandate. - (mmoffitt)
             Re: On LionAir, pilots were never even told about the MCAS - (mmoffitt) - (1)
                 You posted a pic of that module.. which prompted moi to stare at it for some. time. - (Ashton)
         NewYorker article gets it right re. techno and the legal investigation(s) in transit - (Ashton) - (1)
             But "Bidness is SO much better at *EVERYTHING* than Government Bureacrats", no? -NT - (mmoffitt)
         They fought MCAS "more than two dozen times" and it never occurred to them to turn it off? - (mmoffitt) - (27)
             I don't follow that conclusion. - (malraux) - (26)
                 Read the FARs. - (mmoffitt) - (24)
                     Every plane ever made is 100% tech -NT - (drook) - (3)
                         Also: vaccines for preventable childhood diseases that are otherwise miserably fatal - (pwhysall)
                         Should have been more clear: Information Technology (i.e. computers and software) -NT - (mmoffitt) - (1)
                             Which are used to design all of these wonders of the modern age. -NT - (malraux)
                     Meh. - (Another Scott) - (14)
                         "Airline mechanics tried four times since Oct. 26" says it all: how Know they had Fixed it, then? - (Ashton)
                         It is definitely not a "cop out". Them's the rules and every pilot knows it. -NT - (mmoffitt) - (12)
                             Somehow I don't think that the pilots are going to get the lion's share of the blame in these cases. -NT - (Another Scott) - (11)
                                 heh. You don't know the FAA. -NT - (mmoffitt) - (10)
                                     Reuters today. - (Another Scott) - (9)
                                         I'll make you a bet. - (mmoffitt) - (8)
                                             Naah. We'll see. -NT - (Another Scott)
                                             ..think that: *THIS* time, there's been far too much Ink properly flung - (Ashton) - (4)
                                                 The FAA's mission is schizophrenic. - (mmoffitt) - (3)
                                                     So promotion is the goal, safety is a tactic -NT - (drook) - (2)
                                                         Yes, of course, Polly. -NT - (mmoffitt)
                                                         ..as Murican as cyanide-laced *Apple Pie, innit? - (Ashton)
                                             More from Reuters. - (Another Scott) - (1)
                                                 Um, yeah, it kinda was. - (mmoffitt)
                     ? - (malraux) - (4)
                         Did I even mention "root cause"? No. I did not. - (mmoffitt) - (3)
                             so how do you feel about self driving tractor trailers? :-) -NT - (boxley) - (1)
                                 Have those all you want. After I'm dead. ;0) -NT - (mmoffitt)
                             Then be more clear with what you're saying. - (malraux)
                 This logic is impeccable. Or I ain't got no cuth at all. Thanks for Beautiful concision! - (Ashton)
         More more from Reuters - (Another Scott) - (5)
             If this turns out to be true... - (mmoffitt) - (4)
                 Boeing has taken responsibility for both crashes now - (malraux) - (3)
                     BS - (crazy) - (2)
                         That's the part I don't get - (drook)
                         Yeah... - (Another Scott)

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