The United Airlines Master Executive Council (MEC) has taken a different stance, telling the carrier’s pilots that while MCAS may be new, its function is not. As a result, pilots already knew how to manage a MCAS-linked problem.
“Despite the omission of the MCAS description in the initial 737 MAX differences training, United pilots are properly trained in handling an MCAS malfunction,” MEC safety committee chairman Bob Sisk wrote to members. “[W]hen working properly, the system helps us avoid stalls. If it faults or activates due to a related system fault (like an AOA sensor), it presents itself to pilots as runaway stabilizer trim ... something we can recover from using existing [checklist] procedures with the flip of the cutout switches.”
Investigators have said the three-month-old 737 MAX 8 that operated as JT610 experienced faulty sensor data on both the accident flight and several previous segments. Whether MCAS played a role in the JT610 accident remains to be seen, but the bigger-picture issue of how much pilots know about automated systems—and how well-prepared they are to manage failures—is emerging as a focus area.
A 2013 FAA-led study, “Operational Use Of Flight Path Management Systems,” highlighted the degradation of manual flying skills and difficulties transitioning from auto-flight to manual flight as serious, but often latent, safety risks. A rulemaking advisory committee suggested FAA develop training guidance for operators that addresses the issues.
“With regard to undesired flight states, it is always preferable to prevent occurrence,” the committee told FAA. “If prevention fails, early recognition of a developing undesired state with immediate correction is the second most preferred action. If both prevention and early recognition/correction fail, then recognition and recovery from the undesired state are required. A high level of competency in hand-flying (both the physical and cognitive aspects) is necessary for safe flight operations, regardless of the level of autoflight equipment installed, or used, in the aircraft.”
https://www.mro-network.com/manufacturing-distribution/boeing-defends-737-max-information-handling
The point about Boeing's superiority over Airbus stands. If it turns out this accident was caused by MCAS, at least with Boeing the pilot has a workaround. If this was an Airbus, they'd have to ground the entire fleet due to the complete absence of a workaround.
The Times article is nonsense (no surprise in an aviation article).
>>If the pilots of Lion Air 610 did in fact confront an emergency with this type of anti-stall system, they would have had to take a rapid series of complex steps to understand what was happening and keep the jetliner flying properly.
Right. The "complicated step" of hitting both cut-out switches.
>>These steps were not in the manual, and the pilots had not been trained in them.
Even conceding this disputed point, they sure as hell should have been on the airline issued troubleshooting checklist - as the are with United.
>>could have used that switch for a few seconds at a time to counteract what the M.C.A.S. was doing to the stabilizers. But that would have been only a temporary solution...
False. False. False. That can only happen if they don't flip both cut-out switches and leave them in the stab cut-out position. What's described in the article is continued pilot error. Here is an article that includes the new bulletin that references an existing Runaway Stabilizer NNC.
I already said Boeing should have done a better job of notification ("Boeing didn't exactly over-advertise...") but far from making me put Boeing on my list that includes Airbus of things never to board, this only redoubles my conviction that flight in an Airbus is to be avoided at all cost. Boeing *still* lets the pilot fly the aircraft in emergency situations (if only they will) - something Airbus does not do and has no plans to do.
But, I sure as heck won't be getting on a Lion Air flight! ;0)