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New Not quite. This truly was pilot error.
The MCAS can be turned off! This is the crucial difference between Airbus and Boeing. You can disable these kinds of systems on a Boeing, but not on an Airbus. If that aircraft is at high AoA (angle of attack) legitimately or due to faulty readings it can be disabled by manually trimming the aircraft. That turns the system off. To be fair to the pilots, Boeing didn't exactly over-advertise this new system when they moved the engines, but FFS all the pilots had to do was use a little stick and rudder skill and set the trim manually.

More here:
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-maneuvering-characteristics-augmentation-system-mcas-jt610/
bcnu,
Mikem

It's mourning in America again.
New Pilot error if Boeing's manual covered the situation, which it didn't.
NY Times: What the Lion Air Pilots May Have Needed to Do to Avoid a Crash
The situation in this case is further complicated by Boeing’s installation of the system, which the company did without explaining it in the new model’s operating manual. So the pilots might well have been unfamiliar with it.
o o o
If the pilots of Lion Air 610 did in fact confront an emergency with this type of anti-stall system, they would have had to take a rapid series of complex steps to understand what was happening and keep the jetliner flying properly. These steps were not in the manual, and the pilots had not been trained in them.
o o o
If the anti-stall system indeed ran away with the stabilizer control, only a fast sequence of steps by the pilot and first officer could have saved the aircraft, instructions later issued by Boeing show.

On the outside of the yoke in front of both the pilot and the first officer, there is a switch for electrically controlling the trim – the angle of the stabilizers. If the pilot understood what was happening, he could have used that switch for a few seconds at a time to counteract what the M.C.A.S. was doing to the stabilizers. But that would have been only a temporary solution: the pilot has to release the switch or the nose could go too high. But if he releases the switch, the anti-stall system would reactivate a few seconds later, according to a bulletin issued by Boeing.
My emphas1s.
Alex

"There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."

-- Isaac Asimov
Expand Edited by a6l6e6x Nov. 28, 2018, 10:43:56 PM EST
New That sounds like an airline problem.
The United Airlines Master Executive Council (MEC) has taken a different stance, telling the carrier’s pilots that while MCAS may be new, its function is not. As a result, pilots already knew how to manage a MCAS-linked problem.

“Despite the omission of the MCAS description in the initial 737 MAX differences training, United pilots are properly trained in handling an MCAS malfunction,” MEC safety committee chairman Bob Sisk wrote to members. “[W]hen working properly, the system helps us avoid stalls. If it faults or activates due to a related system fault (like an AOA sensor), it presents itself to pilots as runaway stabilizer trim ... something we can recover from using existing [checklist] procedures with the flip of the cutout switches.”

Investigators have said the three-month-old 737 MAX 8 that operated as JT610 experienced faulty sensor data on both the accident flight and several previous segments. Whether MCAS played a role in the JT610 accident remains to be seen, but the bigger-picture issue of how much pilots know about automated systems—and how well-prepared they are to manage failures—is emerging as a focus area.

A 2013 FAA-led study, “Operational Use Of Flight Path Management Systems,” highlighted the degradation of manual flying skills and difficulties transitioning from auto-flight to manual flight as serious, but often latent, safety risks. A rulemaking advisory committee suggested FAA develop training guidance for operators that addresses the issues.

“With regard to undesired flight states, it is always preferable to prevent occurrence,” the committee told FAA. “If prevention fails, early recognition of a developing undesired state with immediate correction is the second most preferred action. If both prevention and early recognition/correction fail, then recognition and recovery from the undesired state are required. A high level of competency in hand-flying (both the physical and cognitive aspects) is necessary for safe flight operations, regardless of the level of autoflight equipment installed, or used, in the aircraft.”

https://www.mro-network.com/manufacturing-distribution/boeing-defends-737-max-information-handling

The point about Boeing's superiority over Airbus stands. If it turns out this accident was caused by MCAS, at least with Boeing the pilot has a workaround. If this was an Airbus, they'd have to ground the entire fleet due to the complete absence of a workaround.

The Times article is nonsense (no surprise in an aviation article).

>>If the pilots of Lion Air 610 did in fact confront an emergency with this type of anti-stall system, they would have had to take a rapid series of complex steps to understand what was happening and keep the jetliner flying properly.

Right. The "complicated step" of hitting both cut-out switches.

>>These steps were not in the manual, and the pilots had not been trained in them.

Even conceding this disputed point, they sure as hell should have been on the airline issued troubleshooting checklist - as the are with United.

>>could have used that switch for a few seconds at a time to counteract what the M.C.A.S. was doing to the stabilizers. But that would have been only a temporary solution...

False. False. False. That can only happen if they don't flip both cut-out switches and leave them in the stab cut-out position. What's described in the article is continued pilot error. Here is an article that includes the new bulletin that references an existing Runaway Stabilizer NNC.

I already said Boeing should have done a better job of notification ("Boeing didn't exactly over-advertise...") but far from making me put Boeing on my list that includes Airbus of things never to board, this only redoubles my conviction that flight in an Airbus is to be avoided at all cost. Boeing *still* lets the pilot fly the aircraft in emergency situations (if only they will) - something Airbus does not do and has no plans to do.

But, I sure as heck won't be getting on a Lion Air flight! ;0)
bcnu,
Mikem

It's mourning in America again.
New Thanks.. a believable Assignment of Responsibility:
FACT that previous Scary Events Did Happen™© ... and 'mis-Management failed to focus on ... better-get-ready to flip Two Switches When--not IF..
the pilot of this newly-Modded-airplane needs to stifle er, *PORPOISING ^v^v^v behavior qed

* if that's not in pilot vocab [yet?] I deem that it IS (like the word 'Buzzz'-as-Bees do): onomatopoeic! based on what-dolphins-do
rather than what they 'say'; precisely as reported thus far/even before black-boxes point out the obvious culprit, an (intermittent caused by marginal sensor design, fabrication or perhaps injury via ill-conceived 'testing').
[Forensics rests case.]


Clearly Boing-Boing's Management-word-salad should be judged, Unacceptable, also cowardly. Imnsho,
further: that little er NOTAM? should have been on a separate celluloid-card
so as to make certain that a Heads-Up was Delivered --> fershure.

{{sheesh!}} People died because of as-yet-unassigned Sloppiness about 'Priority Info'. Its non-delivery.
New In order to deliver a strongly-worded description of how to deal with a problem ...
... you have to acknowledge that there is, in fact, a problem.
--

Drew
New But they *had* DEW/distant-early-warning..
A bloody ANOMALY.. in the case mentioned (which wasn't *yet* fatal). ANOMALY means 'problem' I wot.
One event will suffice.
New Oh, *they* knew
But it was like putting seatbelts in cars. Doing that would be an admission that they were needed.
--

Drew
New ..no wonder that homo-sap 'Angels' are Mephistophelian/hope this clears up that auto-seppuku thing.
     Time to cross off Boeing as well, Mike! - (a6l6e6x) - (13)
         Crichton was right - (drook) - (4)
             That was a great read. - (mmoffitt) - (3)
                 Interesting explanation in the 'pedia for why it's one of his few books not to become a movie - (drook) - (2)
                     You'd have to do it almost docu-drama style. - (static) - (1)
                         From the time I read it, I've wanted to see the movie - (drook)
         Not quite. This truly was pilot error. - (mmoffitt) - (7)
             Pilot error if Boeing's manual covered the situation, which it didn't. - (a6l6e6x) - (6)
                 That sounds like an airline problem. - (mmoffitt) - (5)
                     Thanks.. a believable Assignment of Responsibility: - (Ashton) - (4)
                         In order to deliver a strongly-worded description of how to deal with a problem ... - (drook) - (3)
                             But they *had* DEW/distant-early-warning.. - (Ashton) - (2)
                                 Oh, *they* knew - (drook) - (1)
                                     ..no wonder that homo-sap 'Angels' are Mephistophelian/hope this clears up that auto-seppuku thing. -NT - (Ashton)

Go back to making claims about Wookies and Endor.
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