Lots of good background - http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/12/the-case-for-n-koreas-role-in-sony-hack/
Cheers,
Scott.
Cheers,
Scott.
Krebs on the Sony hack and others.
Lots of good background - http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/12/the-case-for-n-koreas-role-in-sony-hack/ Cheers, Scott. |
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Shades of spy thrillers
They can be identified by the complete lack of identifying features. -- Drew |
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From the "other" category
This one slipped under the radar while the "Kim Young One will not prevent me from seeing a lame comedy" brouhaha was in full swing. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/22/hackers_pop_german_steel_mill_wreck_furnace/ Talented hackers have caused "serious damage" after breaching a German steel mill and wrecking one of its blast furnaces. This was YAN attack on the SCADA system and the perps knew what they were doing. Estimated real life damages are over $100M. No incling which site was hit, but in the comments, someone connects the dots to a 2013 investment report by a Brazilian affiliate of Thyssen-Krup reporting one of their blast furnaces going terminally tits up for unspecified reasons. |
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Do I not see a n-MTon nuke with 8 of its 9 Safeties hors de combat?
Everyone 'here' fully groks to fullness the precariousness of, simply uncountable 'processes' in industries whose CIEIOs have a tendentious.. relationship to "what I.T. does", especially re. all the Hows? Bean counters, probably livid at the thought of supporting Two entirely unconnected systems--and equally ignorant of the manifold subtleties of what fully-[]- Separate means--would be the nemeses of the careful-enough architect of such a proposal, for all obvious pecuniary considerations in every corner-office. Is that even arguable? Can 'one' [ever??] legislate some Musts? (given the odd little side-effect of maybe the Next ad hoc event? sorta leading to the chaotic demise of Westrun-civilization (or at least of: that Holy 'Progress' thing: which is worshipped quite more lavishly than any home-religion is, in any Rich country.)) ie. Have digested, appetizingly-enough: Command and Control (Eric Schlosser 2013), a tour de force of US nukes, sub-titled Nuclear weapons, the Damascus accident and the Illusion of Safety. He makes The Case with 116 pp of Notes/Refs. And That! is about mondo-'security' procedures, weighed in metric tons of paperwork, training etc. I merely presume that: no Industrial profit-driven Corp. ever ever comes within an order/ Review tl;dr: In sum: The US was simply.. lucky-Lucky-LUCKY! across the many examples described, from Day1 until quite recently (nor can that System be certified as idiot-proof now.. or perhaps ever?) Who wrote, The more we learn the darker it gets? Found only this re. torture. Mebbe so, on NPR. As with AGW, Over-population [that which cannot even be discussed] and similar: this Elephant appears to get--even today--mostly lip-service and 'suggestions' that the devoutly-greedy "might deem to Make Happen." SUGGESTIONS? for a mondo-vulture-Capitalist to ... well. you. know. It's dirt snakes. Again and still. So many bitchin epitaphs for the clueless-species; so little time.. (even to sort-them-before-burning.) |
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For this particular incident
The US was not lucky, it likely laid the groundwork and unleashed the beast. The Stuxnet worm was a US/Isreali attack specifically targeting the Iranian enrichment centrifuges. But the thing spread beyond Iran and anyone with the knowledge to dissect a copy got the roadmap to attack Siemens controllers. |
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NY Times: NSA had cracked NK networks years ago.
NY Times: WASHINGTON — The trail that led American officials to blame North Korea for the destructive cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in November winds back to 2010, when the National Security Agency scrambled to break into the computer systems of a country considered one of the most impenetrable targets on earth. FWIW. Cheers, Scott. |