One of the most pressing problems facing the incoming Secretary of Defense is posed by our denouement in Afghanistan. For reasons explained by Paul Sperry in an excellent 30 December op-ed in the New York Post, extricating ourselves from this quagmire is now taking on dangerous overtones, and the need to leave may be approaching at warp speed. The implications for the nature of the American withdrawal may be ominous, but they should not be unexpected. It is now virtually certain that managing a coherent withdrawal will present a major challenge for the incoming defense secretary.
President ObamaÂs 2009 surge strategy for what he and Democrats liked to portray as the Âgood war in Afghanistan was premised upon the assumption that the US could quickly build up and train large Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), including army and police forces. Obama and the Pentagon sold this counterinsurgency strategy to the American people by promising a surge in American forces would quickly weaken the Taliban. The emasculation of the Taliban would permit a rapid expansion of the Afghan security zones controlled by the Kabul government, while the rapid build up of the ANSF would stabilize and grow these zones even further, and thereby set the stage for a quick exit of US combat forces beginning eighteen months from the date of the surge.
Despite its central premise of quickly building up an effective ANSF, the surge-based counterinsurgency plan produced by the Afghan theater commander General Stanley McChrystal did not provide a realistic analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing Afghan army and police forces. Yet these forces were the foundation for the both the expansion and the promised sequence of developments that would enable our quick withdrawal.
McChrystalÂs grotesque oversight became obvious well before the planÂs approval, when his plan was leaked in the early fall of 2009 (as I explained here) [...]
(via James Fallows - http://www.theatlant...-disaster/266859/ )
Cheers,
Scott.