Post #318,479
12/12/09 12:04:15 PM
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I disagree
If, as the author says, it's common for pilots not to get a response on the first call, and if the pilot's standard for "in radio contact" is that they can hear the chatter on the line, then there's a systemic problem. There should be enough people on the ground that if an unexpected call comes in from a plane they're not expecting, someone should notice that and respond to it. Which would also mean if the pilots don't hear a response on the first call they notice it and do something about it.
If the carrier doesn't have any way to remotely detect what frequency a plane is tuned to, and the only other way to contact them is with a silent light that goes out after 30 seconds, that's just plain stupid.
There are plenty of other things that could change to improve the situation, but I think those are the big two.
--
Drew
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Post #318,482
12/12/09 1:05:20 PM
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Hey, it beats arguing about CO2.
:-)
I find it hard to believe that no response is standard. AFAIK, all commercial, police/fire and military 2-way radio practically requires a response to an instruction. E.g. recall the Apollo flights. 2-way radios are naturally noisy and 100+ years of experience indicates that one can't be sure unless one hears it back.
Take a look at what is claimed to be a representation of the radio panel on the A320 - http://www.meriweath...20/ped/radio.html It would appear to be trivial to toggle back to the previous channel. They didn't do that.
More from the Examiner: http://www.examiner....cates-are-revoked
The Airbus 320 departed the San Diego airport at 5:01 pm CDT and was scheduled to land at 8:01 pm CDT, communications were lost at 6:56pm.
Radio communications were reestablished with the aircraft at 8:14pm CDT, at which time flight 188 was over Eau Claire, Wisconsin, roughly 150 miles east of Minneapolis. After multiple attempts were made by air traffic controllers, and other pilots, a chiming radio text message (ACARS) was sent that also went unanswered. However, it is not commonly known that the Airbus 320 does not have a chime alert on text to radio messages (ACARS), it has a small light that only remains illuminated for 30 seconds before it is extinguished.
Authorities still became concerned and contacted NORAD- North American Aerospace Defense Command which readied fighter jets that were prepared to assist in finding and checking on the welfare of the flight. The aircraft reestablished communications before the fighter jets were deployed. The aircraft landed in Minneapolis at 9:04pm, just over one hour late.
[...]
On November 5th, 2009 both Captain Tim Cheney and First Officer Richard Cole filed an appeal with the NTSB, but were also required to inform the FAA of their appeal. If they lose their appeal, they can apply again for a pilot's certificate after one year. The Airline Pilots Association is also working on pushing to overturn the certificate revocation. Previous legal cases indicate that pilots who made more serious flying errors, even some resulting in fatal accidents, have eventually returned to flying duties.
[...]
While Deltas policy states that using laptops or engaging in activity unrelated to the pilots' command of the aircraft during flight is strictly against the airline's flight deck policies, Northwest Airlines does not carry this same policy. Northwest Airlines was however purchased by Delta Airlines last year and the full merger is not expected to be completed until 6 to 12 months from todayÂs date. It is unclear which policy pilots Cheney and Cole had to follow.
Released today, statements from both Officer Timothy Cheney and First officer Richard Cole are directing at least partial blame on the Air traffic Controllers at the Denver Center. First Officer Cole has also stated in hearings with the National Transportation Safety Board that his punishment should not be as severe because the captain had a duty to be in command of the flight.
The FAA has said that after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, controllers have been told to alert the military when a plane goes out of contact for 5 to 10 minutes. They (Denver Controllers) waited for 69 minutes in this instance, a delay that FAA head Randy Babbitt has called "unacceptable.
[...]
(Emphasis added.)
No doubt that there were several mistakes, some of them unacceptable, in the chain of events. If the investigation finds that the Denver ATC people didn't follow the rules, then they should be appropriately reprimanded as well (and/or the rules changed). If the merger and rules about in-cockpit laptops had an impact, then the the in-cockpit standards for merging airlines need to be clarified.
I agree with Lane Wallace - http://correspondent...pilot_excuses.php - I don't think any of that absolves the pilots of primary responsibility.
FWIW.
Cheers,
Scott.
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Post #318,484
12/12/09 4:02:19 PM
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So who is at fault when you miss the turn?
Of course.
I'm sure they were at fault , in fact its plain to see the primary responsibility is theirs.
Judgments (or lack there of) and over-arching over-reaction is the problem I have with this.
The pilots should not have had revocation. Suspension should have been the proper automatic response with administrative review and further proper administrative actions if need be.
As far as I can see, this should have been a case of suspension without pay and "No Harm, No Foul" rules.
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Post #318,487
12/12/09 4:16:55 PM
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Time flies when you are having fun..
aka: are distracted by a temporarily engaging process, while engaged in an utterly routine / robot assisted daily procedure -- flying a modern plane.
Nova has (more than twice?) presented, artfully, the very-many tiny details of crashes: one in S. America, another near Newfoundland (?) -- the latter leaving crew with NO cockpit power to most of the monitoring equipment == seeking airport in low visibility/rain by trying to look out the side window! They didn't make it. It seems to be the sum of an unusual variety of tiny details that kills ie. Who Knew ?!?
(Eventually and $M later the exact cause was pinned precisely (microphotography of the arc burns!) to a single electrical insulation fail-spot within the maze of wires overhead in the cockpit,) the smouldering fire it started -- and new awareness gained in this exercise: that much of the insulation in planes flying [then] were also filled with this particular material whose flammability had somehow escaped the testers. Bad THEM.
Point: perhaps the character flaws of these two consist in their shared inability to see that 'attention span' is a relative matter in their profession; while 'too brief' is the apparent status of most modern Muricans -- 'too long' is an affliction when your distraction takes priority over the basics of Your Job.
That this event did not, in fact, place the passengers in peril (save for the embarrassment of having a military jet on your wingtip, a process which we see here: was also garbled via the uncoordination of ground people within their hierarchies) -- the mere fact of this lengthy distraction makes clear that other basic pilot responsibilities were also suspended: the periodic visual scanning of the skies, being the most obvious side-effect, however perfected are the robotic devices doing the same job.
Judgment is hard; the religionists say [but don't really Mean It, by all daily evidence of hypocrisy] -- God's supposed to do that. We therefore err. My own godlike judgment would be: yes they both deserve to lose their gig, probably current license for a time -- for all legal as well as practical reasons. But, following a penalty interval they should be able to earn their way back through the System -- if they get All-A's on the retests. After all, all Professionals --at root-- merely profess to Know (stuff.) And we each Know how many times we fake ourselves out of a lapse that is merely human.
So let's not go all Cheneyesque on these two, eh? They've been humiliated, so now they are humble -- isn't that what That means?
I, Solomon
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Post #318,515
12/13/09 1:55:00 PM
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Well, we're not talking about them losing communication
because of a comm failure.
I think if they did have comm failure, everyone would have let this go.
But they're flying IFR....they're not on see and avoid (like in smaller planes), they need to know where the other planes are. I believe they have on-board radar, anti-collison gear to avoid other planes, but the bulk of that is (still) via the ATC.
Yes, I'll grant that the plane and passengers were safe. It was a distraction (and a fairly minor distraction at that).
However, the pilots screwed up several times. They screwed up the comm (missed calls). They screwed up their estimated arrival time (which could've been set by a simple time/buzzer). And they weren't focused on flying the plane (which is what they're supposed to be doing).
They're going to be slapped by the FAA. The question is how hard -- and yes the media does play into that. So, they're immediately stripped of their licenses and they've filed appeals. We'll see what shakes out.
Meanwhile -- the pilots can do a fairly minor screwup and get slapped hard. The airplane can be grounded for 12 hours (which passengers held hostage) and nothing happens.
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Post #318,491
12/12/09 9:46:11 PM
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Automation shouldn't exceed automated monitoring
If the plane flies itself, it should also monitor itself. Humans aren't well suited to the role of hyper-vigilant overseer of a long, monotonous, fully-automated process.
Yes, they should still be there to apply judgment when something exceeds design parameters. But any process that can be made hands-off needs to have robust automated monitoring built in. Executing the plan is a fine goal, but it's much more important that you know whether you're executing the plan.
Monitor first, automate second. Otherwise, you're just building a method to execute mistakes faster.
--
Drew
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